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Abstract
This work falls within the context of security in wireless sensor networks.
The aim of this work is to realize applications based on security mechanisms
already present in the literature, trying to improve them where possible.
The first part of this work concerns an authentication mechanism based
on a password system realized as hierarchical multilevel one-way chain. This
model makes possible the key derivation mechanism allowing subjects to
transform the keys in lower privilege keys independently, avoiding a central-
ized password manager. This application considers active subjects and a
passive object. A subject can access the object only if he owns a password
matching one of the password associated with the object.
The second part of this work concerns a protection mechanism of dis-
tributed storage, in which a node can access a remote segment allocated in
the primary memory of another node presenting a gate that grants an access
right for that segment. The nodes form a wireless sensor network, in which
they cooperate in monitoring an environmental parameter.
Finally, those applications have been tested and evaluated.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years wireless sensor networks are taking on an increasingly im-
portant role providing support to a large number of applications. Even
in critical infrastructures the use of wireless sensor networks is becoming
pervasive. Security sensitive applications are leading to a new challenge in
cybersecurity. Indeed, an adversary with a radio transceiver can listen to
conversations between sensors, or can even send malicious commands. A
sensor node (also called mote) is a battery-supply device with limited hard-
ware resources. To give an indicative idea, the devices used to applications
made in this work have features such as an 8MHz processor and a 10kbytes
RAM memory. These technical limitations represent a challenge to imple-
ment security mechanisms entailing low computational costs and low power
consumption. A valid security system must guarantee the messages origin
(Authenticity), must protect data from unauthorized accesses (Confidential-
ity), and must prevent unwanted replays of received messages (Anti-replay).
This thesis looks into two security aspects of wireless sensor networks.
The first part of the thesis deals with an authentication mechanism in
which motes are considered objects that provide functionality. Users who
want to perform any of these functions must demonstrate to have the access
privilege by using an authentication key. To test this protection mechanism
an application has been realized, which is described in detail in Chapter 2.
This application considers that the mote has a set of keys (password) each
of which corresponds to an access privilege. The key system is designed as a
bidimensional hierarchiacal one-way chain. The system owner holds the key
that provides the highest access privilege. Through the mechanisms of key
9
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derivation and key distribution, the owner may grant his access privilege, or
a weaker access privilege, to other users. Conversations between mote and
users are encrypted using a symmetric key cipher, and are authenticated
using the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
The second part of the thesis deals with a mechanism of distributed stor-
age protection. In this system, a node can access a segment stored in the
primary memory of another node presenting a gate for that segment, while
there are no restrictions to access its own primary memory. The segments
are contiguous memory areas that represent the basic unit of information
transmitted between nodes. A gate is a kind of pointer protected crypto-
graphically that refers to a specific segment and that specifies which access
right is granted for that segment. On a remote segment are allowed op-
erations such as reading or replacing the contents. These operations are
made possible through the protection primitive. A node which generates
a gate can relay it to other nodes. To test this protection mechanism, an
application has been realized that is described in detail in Chapter 3.
Chapter 2
Password System
2.1 Overview
The scenario of this application considers an object which supports some
functionalities. The object in question is a mote and the functionality im-
plemented are those typical of an object of this type, such as to read a value
through the sensors, to start polling, to change the sampling period, etc.
The mote is associated with a password system. Each feature offered by the
mote belongs to an access privilege each of which is associated with one of
the passwords of the password system. In addition to the typical functions
of a sensor node, some special functions are provided for the management
of the password system. It is possible to recalculate the whole password
system, or only a subset of it. A user may request to carry out any of the
features supported by the mote assuming that he has a password that allows
access to that feature. The system owner holds the password with the high-
est privilege among those associated with the mote. This allows the system
owner to perform all the functions offered by the mote. The password sys-
tem is made in a way that allows a user who owns one of these passwords,
to calculate a password of lower privilege through a key derivation mecha-
nism. The application allows other users to may be added to the system.
Indeed, a user A can add a new user B to the system, as long as user A
owns a password to perform this functionality. A user may also be deleted
from the system. In addition, the sistem owner can change the password
system, for example, by recalculating all the elements, so as to invalidate
the passwords of other users or a subset of users only. The user-mote com-
11
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munication is via the standard 802.15.4 [1]. The user-user communication
is via the standard TCP/IP. A security protocol is used to ensure confiden-
tiality, authenticity and resistance to replay attacks. This chapter describes
the theoretical model of the password system, describes the implementation
of the application based on the theoretical model, and finally reports the
performance analysis.
2.2 Protection Model
The protection model used to implement this application is based on the
work described in the article [2] which is summarized in this section.
Two types of actors are part of the model:
• subjects, who are active entities, which require functionalities
• objects, which are passive entities, which offer functionalies
Each object G belongs to a type T. Type T of an object specifies the op-
eration that it provides and also states the set of access rights and the as-
sociations between the operations and the access rights. In order to access
an object G of a given type T and to perform one of the operations of this
type, a subject must hold the access rights leading to successful execution
of this operation. One of the common problems of a protecion system is to
define what access rights a user has on the protected object. Typically the
protected object has a set of passwords each of which is associated with an
access privilege. In turn, each access privilege is associated to one or more
access rights. An object G should be accessed by a subject S if and only
if he has a key k corresponding to one of the passwords of G. The key k is
used to prove that the subject has the right to perform the functionality as-
sociated to that access privilege. The protection model allows to distribute,
derive and revoke the key k. A subject S who has a key k to access an object
G can distribute his key to another user S’. In this way also the subject S’
can access the object G. The key derivation mechanism allows to turn the
key k in a key k’ offering lower privileges than k. In the protection mecha-
nism model [2] key derivation follows a distributed approach. In fact, each
subject S that possesses a key k to access to an object G, is able to derive
its key obtaining a key k’ granting weaker privilege with respect to k, and
S is also able to distribute k’ to another entity S’. This mechanism allows
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keys to spread easily in the system. The protection model also supports the
key revocation mechanism. A key must be revoked when it can no longer be
used to access an object. The key revocation mechanism should be selective
in order to revoke only a subset of the keys of a given object. Furthermore,
revocation of a key k should result in the revocation of all keys derived from
k.
2.2.1 Access Privilege
Let us suppose that an object G belongs to type T. Let us also suppose
that type T specifies operations op0, op1,... and also that it specifies the
access right ar0, ar1,... etc. For each operation opi, type T specifies what
the necessary access rights are to successfully perform the operation opi.
An access privilige is defined as the set of one or more access rights. In
the protection model [2] each access privilege is always part of a privilege
level. Privilege levels are defined by the type T of the object and they are
sorted in descending order of privilege. Let us suppose a type T defines n
privilege levels: the level lv0 is the one with the highest privilege, while the
privilege level opn−1 has the lowest privilege. Each privilege level lvi consists
of an ordered set of access privileges. The access privilege api,0 belonging to
the privilege level lvi is the strongest access privilege, while the subsequent
access privileges api,1, api,2,... have descending privilege. A fundamental
property of the protection model is that in any privilege level lvi, the j-th
access privilege api,j inherits the access rights of all the subsequent weaker
access privilege api,j+1, api,j+2,... etc. When a subject S creates an object
G, the subject S has the access privilege ap0,0, which is the strongest access
privilege of the highest privilege level lv0.
2.2.2 Password and Keys
A one-way function is easy to calculate but computationally hard to invert.
Let us suppose that F is a one-way function. Given a value x calculate
F(x) is simple, while, given a value y, is computationally infeasible to find
a value x such that y = F(x). A one-way chain is definied as a sequence
of values x0, x1,...,xn−1 such that xi = F (xi−1) for 0 < i ≤ n − 1. The
first value x0 is called the chain seed. A hierarchical bidimensional one-way
chain is a collection of chains organized in two levels. The first level is a
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single chain, which is called the primary chain. Each value of the primary
chain is the seed of a second level chain called the secondary chain. In the
protection model [2] a password wi,j is associated with each access privilege
api,j . For this reason, the password system takes the form of a bidimensional
one-way chain. The primary chain is formed by the passwords associated
with the stronger access privilege of each privilege level. Each password
belonging to the primary chain is the seed of the respective secondary chain.
The password w0,0 associated with the strongest access privilege ap0,0 is
generated randomly. A one-way function called the primary function PF
is used to calculate the passwords belonging to the primary chain, with the
exception of the seed. For example, the second password of the primary
chain is calculated as w1,0 = PF (w0,0). Of course, the length of the primary
chain corresponds to the number of privilege levels. Indeed, if a type T
defines three privilege levels lv0, lv1 and lv2, the primary chain will consist
of the passwords w0,0, w1,0 and w2,0. In addition to the primary function
PF , other one-way functions called secondary function SFi are used. A
different secondary function SFi is established for each secondary chain.
For example, the second element of the secondary chain associated with the
privilege level lvi is calculated as wi,1 = SFi(wi,0).
Key Distribution and Derivation A subject S who has a key k cor-
responding to a password wi,j belonging to the bidimensional hierarchical
one-way chain, can transmit the access privilege corresponding to the pass-
word k to another subject S’ just by sending a copy of the password to
subject S’. Alternatively, the subject S can derive his key k by obtain-
ing a key k’ that provides a weaker access privilege. The rules of the key
derivation mechanism are described below. The following rules are directly
extrapolated from article [2].
• Subject S that holds key k matching password wi,0 for the strongest
access privilege of privilege level lvi can derive key k’ matching pass-
word wi′,0 for the strongest access privilege of a subsequent privilege
level lvi′ , i
′ > i.
To this aim, S will apply primary function PF iteratively i′− i times.
• Subject S that holds key k matching password wi,j for the j-th access
privilege of privilege level lvi can derive key k’ matching password
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wi,j′ , j
′ > j for a weaker access privilege of the same privilege level.
To this aim, S will apply secondary function SFi iteratively j
′ − j
times.
• Subject S that holds key k matching password wi,0 for the strongest
access privilege of privilege level lvi can derive key k’ matching pass-
word wi′,j for an access privilege of a lower privilege level lvi′ , i
′ > i.
To this aim, S will apply primary function PF iteratively i′ − i times
to find the key corresponding to the password wi′,0 of the strongest
access privilege of privilege level lvi′ . Then, this key will be used to
evaluate key k’ by applying the i-th secondary function SFi iteratively
j times.
As a result of these rules, a subject S that has the password w0,0 can
calculate all system’s passwords by applying the primary function PF and
the secondary functions SFi iteratively. Through the use of one-way func-
tions, a subject S that has a key k’ cannot calculate a key k’ with stronger
access privilege. This is a fundamental aspect of this protection system.
Key Revocation The key revocation can be easily obtained by replacing
the one-way functions. Replacing the primary function FP involves the in-
validation of all keys of the system with exception of the key w0,0. Replacing
one of the secondary functions SFi involves the invalidation of all the keys
belonging to the privilege level lvi with exception of the key wi,0 with the
strongest privilege of that level. This simple mechanism of key revocation
has important properties:
• Revocation is transitive. If a key k is revocked, also all copies of this
key are revoked, regardless of the person who owns them. In addition,
all the keys that have been obtained by derivating k are revoked.
• Revocation is selective. It is possible to revoke only a subset of the
keys that makes up the password system.
• Revocation is temporal. Revocation may be canceled by restoring the
original one-way function.
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2.3 Implementation
In this section is described a possible implementation of the system presented
in the above-mentioned scenario. The structure, the design choices, the
algorithms and the solutions adopted during the construction of the system
are also described. The motes used in this work are equipped with TinyOS,
and the programming language used is nesC. For the client side, represented
by the subjects, a java application was made. The operating system used
to program the motes and to run the the client side application is Ubuntu
14.04 Trusty Tahr.
2.3.1 Hierarchical Bidimensional One-Way Chain
The first idea of hierarchical bidimensional one-way chain, is shown in the
figure 2.1. For brevity, from now on the hierachical bidimensional one-way
Figure 2.1: Hierarchical bidimensional one-way chain model
chain will be referred just as bidimensional chain. The structure is com-
posed of L rows, each of which represents a different privilege level, and R
columns, each of which represents different access privilege. Every element
wi,j represents an authentication key. The element w0,0 has the strongest
access privilege; in general the higher is the bidimensional chain element
index, the lower is the access privilege. The first column of the bidimen-
sional chain, represented by red circles, is the primary chain, whereas each
row, represented by black circles, is the corrisponding secondary chain. An
user which possesses a key wi,j inherits the access rights granted by the sub-
CHAPTER 2. PASSWORD SYSTEM 17
sequent authentication keys (wi,j+1, wi,j+2, ..., wi,R−1) of the same privilege
level lvi. Let us see how the bidimensional chain it is calculated. As shown
in the description of the theoretical model, the bidimensional chain is calcu-
lated using one-way functions. For calculating the primary chain is used the
so-called primary function PF , while for calculating the secondary chains
are used the so-called secondary functions SFi. In this work as one-way
function was chosen HMAC-SHA-256-128 [3], which produces a result of 128-
bit. The use of the hash function SHA-256 makes the HMAC-SHA-256-128
a one-way function. For brevity, the HMAC-SHA-256-128 it will be referred
just as HMAC. Each authentication key wi,j has a size of 16 bytes. The
element w0,0, also known as the seed of the bidimensional chain is randomly
generated. The generic element wi,0 with i 6= 0 belonging to the primary
chain is computed as:
wi,0 = HMAC(pck, wi−1,0)
where pck (primary chain key) is a cryptographic key. Each primary chain’s
element serves as a seed for generating the corrisponding secondary chain.
The generic secondary chain’s element wi,j with j 6= 0 is computed as:
wi,j = HMAC(scki, wi,j−1)
where scki (secondary chain key) is a cryptographic key used for calculating
the i-th secondary chain. Every cryptographic key pck and scki are simple
8-bit counters. Hence, the difference between the primary function PF and
the secondary functions SFi is given simply by the cryptographic key (pck,
scki) used to compute the HMAC.
Before seeing a possible improvement of the bidimensional chain struc-
ture, we should make a consideration on the privilege array. The privilege
array features L elements, each of which is long at least R bit. L is the
number of privilege levels and R is the maximum number of access privilege
in a privilege level. Every element of the bidimensional chain has a corre-
sponding bit in the privilege array. In each array element, the r-th bit, if
asserted, specifies that the r-th access privilege is granted to the correspond-
ing privilege level.
Consider the table 2.1 where three privilege level and six access rights
are considered. In this example, each access privilege has only one access
right. A user owning an authentication key related to the access right ari
inherits all the subsequent access rights of greater index that are defined for
that privilege level. Therefore, in this example the authentication key w1,3
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Table 2.1: Privilege array example
lv/ar ar0 ar1 ar2 ar3 ar4 ar5
lv0 1 1 1 1 1 1
lv1 0 0 1 1 1 1
lv2 0 0 0 0 1 1
belonging to privilege level lv1 with access right ar3 possesses also the access
right ar4 and ar5, but not the access right ar2, ar1 and ar0. Each of the
features provided by the mote is associated with an access right ari. The
privilege array is used to define which features are allowed for each privilege
level.
In the previous implementation an element of the bidimensional chain is
calculated for every access privilege of every privilege level, or equivalently,
for each bit of the privilege array. But look at the table 2.1. Why calculating
an authentication key for those access right defined to zero? In fact, it
makes no sense that a user self authenticates using an authentication key
associated to an access right which it does not possess. It is possible to
save memory avoiding the computation of these unused authentication keys.
This is why the idea of reduced bidimensional chain is introduced, where are
calculated only those authentication keys associated with those access rights
defined to one. Referring to the proposed configuration from table 2.1, the
bidimensional chain becomes as shown in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Reduced bidimensional chain example
In this implementation it is calculated an authentication key wi,j for
every elements belonging to the primary chain (red circle), and only the
elements belonging to the secondary chains that have the corrisponding bit
CHAPTER 2. PASSWORD SYSTEM 19
in the privilege array set to one. In this way 16 bytes are saved for each au-
thentication key which is not calculated. Each authentication key belonging
to the bidimensional chain, is uniquely identified by an identificator called
kid. kid is implemented as an 8-bit counter. The authentication key w0,0
has kid equal to zero. The bidimensional chain is implemented as an array
of ring type elements, defined as:
typede f s t r u c t r i ng {
u i n t 8 t lv ; /∗ p r i v i l e g e l e v e l ∗/
u i n t 8 t ap ; /∗ a c c e s s p r i v i l e g e ∗/
u i n t 8 t key [ 1 6 ] ; /∗ au then t i c a t i on key ∗/
} r i ng ;
where:
• lv is the privilege level
• ap is the access privilege
• key is the authentication key value
The kid value is used to directly access this array.
2.3.2 System Initialization and User Management
A user, in order to interact with the mote, has to meet two essential in-
formation: he must have one of the authentication keys that makes up the
bidimensional chain, and he must share a symmetric key with the mote. Let
us consider first the system owner. The system owner is the only user who
should be registered on the more during the installation of the application.
With the word registration it is meant to enter a symmetric key, which is
associated with the user identifier of the system owner, in the code of the
application. In this way, the system owner would still be registered, even
when restarting the mote. On the client side, instead, it is used a standalone
program that creates a file user.bin which stores the information that the
system owner needs to know to interact with the mote as the symmetric key,
the authentication key, the kid and the user identifier. The system owner’s
authentication key is the one with the greatest privilege among those that
make up the bidimensional chain, that is the key w0,0 having kid = 0. The
file user.bin also contains that information which is necessary for the key
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derivation mechanism. The information contained in the user.bin file are
read when the client application starts.
All other users are registered at runtime instead. A user which has
sufficient privileges is able to add more users to the system. For example,
let us suppose Alice wants to add Bob to the system. In order to do this,
Alice has to make a few steps:
firstly, she must derive her authentication key to obtain an authentication
key that has access privileges less than or equal to hers. Secondly, she
must communicate to the mote the symmetric key and the user identifier of
Bob. Thirdly, she must communicate to Bob his new credentials. Bob, after
receiving the credentials from Alice, saves them in his file user.bin. Finally,
Bob can interact with the mote.
A user which has sufficient privileges is also able to remove other users
from the system. Let us now suppose Alice wants to remove Bob from the
system. Alice needs to communicate to the mote the user identifier of Bob,
and then the mote eliminates Bob from its users database. Bob can still
send messages to the mote, but without receiving any response.
The mechanisms for adding and removing users is discussed with more
detail in the sections describing the functions addUser() and removeuser().
2.3.3 Communication Protocol
The communication protocol used by all the implemented functions is the
following:
M1 Alice → mote: {t,m}KA
M2 mote → Alice: {t,m}KA
t is a message autentication code computed as:
t = CBC-MAC(authentication key,m)
m is the message body. The generic structure of field m is as follows:
M1 m = function id, nonce, kid, value
M2 m = function id, nonce, errno, value
Let us analyze the three security properties guaranteed by the protocol.
• Secrecy : Both message M1 and M2 are encrypted using a symmetric
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key. Each user shares with the mote a different symmetric key, which
is never transmitted or revealed to other users. The cipher used is
AES-128 in CBC mode of encryption [4].
• Authenticity : Messages authenticity is provided by the message au-
thentication code t. Only a user who owns the authentication key
identified by kid can calculate t. Anyway, multiple users are allowed
to have the same authentication key.
• No-replay : Replay attacks are prevented through nonces. Nonces are
implemented as counters. If the mote or if a user receives a message
with a nonce outdated, the message is discarded.
2.3.4 Authentication Procedure
The authentication process is done each time a message is received, both
from mote and users. The purpose of this procedure is to verify the authen-
ticity of the message. Let us suppose that Alice sends a request message
to mote. The request message contains the identifier kid related to the au-
thentication key used to calculate the message authentication code t and
the function identifier of the requested feature. In addition, the message is
encrypted by the Alice’s symmetric key KA. Mote receives the request mes-
sage. It uses the Alice’s user identifier indicated in the message header for
accessing its users database. Then it checks if a user is known, having the
user identifier indicated in the message. If not, the message is discarded,
otherwise the symmetric key KA associated with Alice is taken and the
message is decrypted. After decrypting the message, the mote accesses the
bidimensional chain and takes the authentication key associated with the
received kid. Then, it computes the message authentication code as:
t′ = CBC-MAC(authentication key,m)
If the message authentication code t’ is equal to the received t, the mes-
sage is authentic. The authentication procedure is also done on the client
side. The mote, indeed, authenticates the response message with the same
authentication key used by Alice for the request message.
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2.3.5 Access Privilege Verification
Let us suppose that Alice sends a request message to mote. The access priv-
ilege verification is done by the mote after it has checked that the received
message is authentic. If the message is authentic, the mote should checks
whether the authentication key used from Alice grants the access right for
the requested function. The mote uses the kid value for accessing the bidi-
mensional chain, and picks both privilege level lvi and access privilege apj ,
related to the Alice’s authentication key. If the function id value specified
in the request message is smaller than j, then the function request is denied.
Otherwise, the mote uses i as index to access the privilege level lvi and to
pick the related decimal value. This decimal value is considered as a bit
mask and the function id value as a bit index k. If the k-th bit of the bit
mask is equal to one, the function is allowed. Otherwise, the function is
denied.
2.3.6 Message Freshness Verification
The messages freshness is provided by nonces. Nonces are implemented
as 24-bit counters. The size of 24-bits allows to send nearly 17 million of
messages before going to the overflow. For each registered user, the mote
stores the value of the nonce. When a new user is added to the system, the
value of its nonce is set to zero. Let us suppose that Alice is a registered user,
and that the nonce associated with Alice has value n. Let also suppose that
the mote receives a message from Alice, which contains a nonce having value
m. If m is less than or equal to n, then the message is not fresh and Alice’s
request is rejected. Otherwise, if m is greater than n, the nonce is considered
valid. Mote saves the value m as the last fresh nonce received from Alice.
After the mote has served Alice’s request, it composes the response message
using as a nonce the value m + 1, and sends it to Alice. On the client side,
Alice should receive a message with a nonce greater than the one she had
sent. Otherwise, the received message is not fresh, and it is discarded. On
the client side users save the nonce in a file called nonce.bin.
2.3.7 User-Mote Communication
Communication between a user and the mote can occur in two ways:
• Directly, using a mote as antenna
CHAPTER 2. PASSWORD SYSTEM 23
• Indirectly, using an intermediate node
Direct Communication Direct communication is via the standard 802.15.4.
Currently, a standard commercial computer does not have the hardware
necessary to communicate using the 802.15.4. To overcome this lack, it is
possible to use a mote as antenna. The mote in question must be properly
programmed. Among the applications offered by the package TinyOS, the
application BaseStation is relevant for this study.
BaseStation is described in README.txt as:
”BaseStation is an Application that acts as a simple Active Message bridge
between the serial and radio links.”
Its task is to capture the radio messages and to send them to the computers
via the serial interface, and vice versa. For the purpose of this thesis, the
BaseStation application shall be slightly modified, in order to capture only
those messages that have our address as destination address. The address of
a mote corresponds to its node identifier, and it is set during the installation
phase. Let us suppose the address of our mote antenna is set to 1, then the
BaseStation application must be installed using the command:
make tmote install.1
Another change to be made to the application BaseStation is to expand
the messages payload size. Indeed, the default payload size is 29 bytes. To
extend this value, it is sufficient to add the following line to the makefile:
CFLAGS + = -DTOSH_DATA_LENGTH = 50
In this example, the payload size has been extended to 50 bytes. Once the
modified BaseStation is installed on mote, it can be used as an antenna.
TinyOS supports a Java SDK that provides all the necessary objects to:
• synchronize the mote with the computer’s serial interface
• send / receive / create messages for standard 802.15.4
Figure 2.3: Direct communication selection from GUI
A user who wants to use the direct communication should plug into the
computer a mote with the modified BaseStation installed on. From a ter-
minal the command motelist should be executed to show which motes are
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connected to the computer. The figure 2.4 shows a mote Moteiv tmote sky
connected to the serial port /dev/ttyUSB0.
Figure 2.4: Motelist command output
From a terminal the command sudo chmod 666 /dev/ttyUSB0 should
be executed to grant both read and write access rights to the serial port
/dev/ttyUSB0. As shown in figure 2.3 the address of the serial port must
be added to the application interface in the Mote Source field. Pressing the
Start button the application is synchronized with the mote, which can be
now used as an antenna.
Indirect Communication Indirect communication uses an intermediate
node between mote and user. Communication between the user and the in-
termediate node takes place via the standard TCP/IP, while communication
between the intermediate node and the mote is via the standard 802.15.4.
The intermediate node must indeed be able to communicate via standard
802.15.4. Supporting indirect communication has the purpose of making
those users who do not have the hardware needed for the standard 802.15.4
able to interact with the mote. Furthermore, connecting the intermediate
node to the internet makes it possible for a user to communicate remotely
with the mote. If a user decides to use the indirect communication method,
he has to select the corresponding checkbox in the client interface, and to
insert the IP address of the intermediate node as shown in figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Indirect communication selection from GUI
Let us deepen how indirect communication takes place, assuming that
Alice wants to perform one of the functions offered by the mote. Alice
prepares the request message. The message has an header in plaintext,
which contains the Alice’s user identifier, and a body encrypted using the
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symmetric key shared between Alice and mote. In case of direct communica-
tion, Alice would send the message directly to the mote using the standard
802.15.4. In case of indirect communication, instead, Alice sends her user
identifier and the ciphertext to the intermediate node. The intermediate
node uses the information received from Alice to compose the message ac-
cording to standard 802.15.4 and sends it to the mote. The mote receives
the message and behaves as if it had received from Alice. Once finished, the
mote sends the response message to the intermediate node, encrypting it
with the symmetric key shared with Alice. The intermediate node sends to
Alice the mote’s user identifier and the ciphertext. Now Alice processes the
content of the message as if received directly from the mote. Communication
between Alice and the intermediate node is not encrypted, since the content
of the message is already encrypted. The intermediate node is not able to
decipher the content of the message received from Alice, as it does not know
the symmetric key. The intermediate node is implemented as a TCP server.
Each time it receives an TCP/IP message from a user, it converts it into a
802.15.4 message and sends it to mote. When the mote responds, it converts
the 802.15.4 message into a TCP/IP message and sends it to the user. The
intermediate node does not handle polling messages.
2.3.8 Functions And Access Privileges
The mote provides twelve functionality that can be requested by users, and
they are:
• changeSeed()
• replacePrimaryFunction()
• replaceSecondaryFunction()
• changePrivilege()
• getUserList()
• addUser()
• removeUser()
• startPolling()
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• stopPolling()
• setSamplingTime()
• getSamplingTime()
• getLightValue()
The functions listed above are sorted in descending order of relevance. Each
of these functions corresponds to an access right. As mentioned in the de-
scription of the theoretical model, an access privilige has one or more access
rights. The first three functions are part of the strongest access privilege,
while all other functions are associated with different access privilege. This
means that at most, a privilege level has ten access privileges. The appli-
cation defines three privilege levels, each of which has a different number
of access privileges. The privilege level lv0 owns all access privileges. The
level lv1 has the access privileges from addUser() until getLightValue() The
level lv2 has the access privileges associated with getSamplingTime() and
getLightValue(). Each privilege level can be represented as a mask of ten
bits. Each bit is associated with an access privilege. If a bit is equal to 1 it
means that the access privilege associated with that bit is defined for that
privilege level. Therefore, the bit masks for each privilege level are:
• lv0: 1111111111
• lv1: 1111111000
• lv2: 1100000000
Of course, the least significant bit corresponds to the strongest access privi-
lege. These three bit masks form the so-called privilege array. The privilege
array is an array that consists of three uint16 t elements each of which
represents a bit mask.
2.3.9 Functions Implementation
In this section is described the implementation of all the features offered
by the mote that can be requested by the users, and functions that are
performed between users.
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Change Seed The changeSeed() function is used to recalculate the entire
bidimensional one-way chain, causing the invalidation of all the authenti-
cation key owned by the users. The changeSeed() function can only be
requested by the system owner, or, at least, by someone who possesses the
authentication key w0,0. The reason for this restriction is the following.
The user who changed the seed of the bidimensional one-way chain should
be able to derive all the authentication keys in order to distribute them
to those users who requested them. Indeed, only the user who owns the
authentication key w0,0 can derive the entire bidimensional one-way chain.
After this introduction, let us suppose that the system owner decides to
change the seed of the bidimensional one-way chain. The new seed is gener-
ated randomly by the system owner, and it is inserted into the changeSeed()
function’s request message. The system owner authenticates the message
with his authentication key. Next it encrypts the message with his symmet-
ric key and sends it to the mote. As the system owner sent the message,
he replaces his authentication key with the seed just generated. The mote
receives the message and decrypts it with the symmetric key associated with
the system owner. If the message is authentic, and the nonce is fresh, the
mote calculates the whole bidimensional one-way chain using the new seed
and using the default cryptographic keys (pck, scki) for the HMAC func-
tion. Otherwise, the mote sends an error message to the system owner.
Once the mote has finished to recalculate the bidimensional one-way chain,
it sends the changeSeed() function’s response message to the system owner.
This message is authenticated with the new authentication key w0,0 and is
encrypted with the symmetric key associated with the system owner. The
system owner receives the message, decrypts it with its symmetric key and
verifies the authenticity using the new authentication key. If the message is
authentic and the nonce is fresh, the system owner reads the outcome of the
operation. If there are no errors, the file user.bin is updated with the new
authentication key value and with the default values of keys pcki and scki.
Otherwise, the message is discarded.
Replace Primary Function The replacePrimaryFunction() function is
used to recalculate the entire bidimensional one-way chain, exept for the
authentication key w0,0, causing the invalidation of all the authentication
key owned by the users. The replacePrimaryFunction() function can be re-
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quested by the system owner only, or, at least, by someone who possesses
the authentication key w0,0. The reason is the same as for the change-
Seed() function. Let us suppose that the system owner decides to change
the primary function PF of the bidimensional one-way chain. Changing the
primary function means to change the function PF by which the elements of
the primary chain of the bidimensional one-way chain are calculated. In this
implementation the replacement of the primary function consists in chang-
ing the key pck used in the HMAC function. In fact, a generic element wi,0
with i 6= 0 belonging to the primary chain is computed as:
wi,0 = HMAC(pck, wi−1,0)
Through a dialog, the application requires the user to enter the new pck
Figure 2.6: replacePrimaryFunction() function dialog
value. This value must be an integer between 0 and 255, otherwise an er-
ror is reported. The new pck is inserted into the replacePrimaryFunction()
function’s request message. The system owner authenticates the message
with his authentication key. Next it encrypts the message with his sym-
metric key, and sends it to the mote. The mote receives the message and
decrypts it with the symmetric key associated with the system owner. If the
message is authentic, and the nonce is fresh, the mote calculates the whole
bidimensional one-way chain, except the first element w0,0, using the new
pck value. Indeed, recalculating the primary chain elements involves to re-
calculate all the corresponding secondary chains. The secondary chains are
recalculated using the same keys scki. Otherwise, the mote sends an error
message to the system owner. Once the mote has finished to recalculate
the bidimensional one-way chain, the replacePrimaryFunction() function’s
response message is sent to the system owner. This message is authenticated
with the authentication key w0,0 and is encrypted with the symmetric key
associated with the system owner. The system owner receives the message,
decrypts it with its symmetric key and verifies the authenticity using his
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authentication key. If the message is authentic and the nonce is fresh, the
system owner reads the outcome of the operation. If there are no errors, the
file user.bin is updated with the new pck value. Otherwise, the message is
discarded.
Replace Secondary Function The replaceSecondaryFunction() function
is used to recalculate only one of the secondary chains that make up the
bidimensional one-way chain. This operation involves the invalidation of all
the authentication key owned by the users, that belongs to that secondary
chain. The replaceSecondaryFunction() function can be requested by the
system owner only, or at least, by someone who possesses the authentica-
tion key w0,0. The reason is the same as for the changeSeed() function. Let
us suppose that the system owner decides to change one of the secondary
functions SFi of the bidimensional one-way chain. Changing the secondary
function means to change the function SFi by which the elements of that
secondary chain of the bidimensional one-way chain are calculated. In this
implementation the replacement of the secondary function consists in chang-
ing the key scki used in the HMAC function. Indeed, a generic element wi,j
with j 6= 0 is computed as:
wi,j = HMAC(scki, wi,j−1)
Of course the secondary chains number is equal to the number of privilege
levels. In addition, each secondary chain is calculated using a different key
scki. Through a dialog, the application requires the user to enter the new
Figure 2.7: replaceSecondaryFunction() function dialog
scki value, and to enter the privilege level of the secondary chain that he
wants to recalculate. The scki value must be an integer between 0 and
255, while the privilege level must be an integer between 0 and the privilege
levels number minus 1. Otherwise, an error is reported. The scki and the
privilege level are inserted into the replaceSecondaryFunction() function’s
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request message. The system owner authenticates the message with his au-
thentication key. Next it encrypts the message with his symmetric key, and
sends it to the mote. The mote receives the message and decrypts it with
the symmetric key associated with the system owner. If the message is au-
thentic, and the nonce is fresh, the mote recalculates the secondary chain
corresponding to the privilege level indicated in the message, using the new
scki. Otherwise, the mote sends an error message to the system owner.
Once the mote has finished to recalculate the secondary chain, it sends
the replaceSecondaryFunction() function’s response message to the system
owner. This message is authenticated with the authentication key w0,0 and
encrypted with the symmetric key associated with the system owner. The
system owner receives the message, decrypts it with its symmetric key and
verifies the authenticity using his authentication key. If the message is au-
thentic and the nonce is fresh, the system owner reads the outcome of the
operation. If there are no errors, the file user.bin is updated with the new
scki value. Otherwise, the message is discarded.
Change Privilege The changePrivilege() function is used to change the
access privileges configuration for a specific privilege level. A privilege level
specifies which access privileges it possesses through a bit mask. Let us take
as an example an application offering three access rights, which could be
read, write and execute. In this case, a privilege level is defined by an array
of three bits, such as it is shown in table 2.2. As explained in the theoretical
Table 2.2: Privilege array example
Read Write Execute
0 1 1
model description, the lower the index of an access privilege, the greater the
privilege it grants. In the example shown in the table 2.2, the privilege level
is represented by the bit mask 110 which corresponds to the decimal value
6. If we wanted to remove from that privilege level the right access write,
the bit mask would become 100 corresponding to the decimal value 4. The
privilege array is implemented as follow:
u i n t 1 6 t p r i v i l e g e a r r a y [ 3 ] = {
1023 , /∗ 0011 1111 1111 ∗/
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1016 , /∗ 0011 1111 1000 ∗/
768 /∗ 0011 0000 0000 ∗/
} ;
The privilege array has a decimal value for each privilege level. In the
example the first privilege level is associated with the decimal value 1016
that corresponds to the bit mask 0011 1111 1000. Let us suppose that
Alice, which has sufficient privileges wants to change the access privilege
configuration of a certain privilege level. Through a dialog, the application
Figure 2.8: changePrivilege() function dialog
requires Alice to enter the decimal value representing the new bit mask and
to enter the privilege level that she wants to modify. The decimal value must
be an integer between 0 and 2access privileges number − 1, while the privilege
level must be an integer between 0 and the number of privilege levels minus
1. Otherwise, an error is reported. The decimal value and the privilege level
are inserted into the changePrivilege() function’s request message. Alice
authenticates the message with his authentication key. Next it encrypts the
message with his symmetric key, and sends it to the mote. The mote receives
the message and decrypts it with the symmetric key associated with that
user. If the message is authentic, and the nonce is fresh, the mote changes the
access privilege configuration corresponding to the privilege level indicated
in the message, using the decimal value. Otherwise, the mote sends an error
message to Alice. Once the mote has finished to copy the new value, it sends
the changePrivilege() function’s response message to Alice. This message is
authenticated with the same authentication key used in the request message
and encrypted with the symmetric key associated with that user. Alice
receives the message, decrypts it with its symmetric key and verifies the
authenticity using his authentication key. If the message is authentic and
the nonce is fresh, Alice reads the outcome of the operation. If there are no
errors, the file user.bin is updated with the new value of the privilege array.
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Otherwise, the message is discarded.
Get Users List The getUserList() function is used to download the regis-
tered users list from the mote. Let us suppose that Alice, which has sufficient
privileges wants to know which users are registered on the mote. Then, she
compose the getUserList() function’s request message. Alice authenticates
the message with his authentication key. Next she encrypts the message
with her symmetric key, and sends it to the mote. The mote receives the
message and decrypts it with the symmetric key associated with Alice. If
the message is authentic, and the nonce is fresh, the mote accesses the users
database. Otherwise, the sensor sends an error message to Alice. Then, it
inserts in the getUserList() function’s response message the number of reg-
istered users followed by the user identifier of all the users. For simplicity,
the maximum number of users supported by the mote is such as to allow
to insert the entire users list in a single response message. Once the mote
has finished to copy the users list, it sends the response message to Alice.
This message is authenticated with the same authentication key used in
the request message and it is encrypted with the symmetric key associated
with Alice. Alice receives the message, decrypts it with its symmetric key
and verifies the authenticity using his authentication key. If the message
is authentic and the nonce is fresh, the users list is printed to the screen.
Otherwise, the message is discarded.
Add User The addUser() function is used to register a new user on the
mote. Let us suppose that Alice wants to add Bob to the system. In addition
to the communication between Alice and the mote, this function also involves
the communication between Alice and Bob. The communication between
Alice and Bob is via TCP/IP, and both users should be connected to the
same local network. Through a dialog, the application requires Alice to enter
some information concerning Bob. The first piece of information is the Bob
user identifier. The privilege level and the access privilege identify one of the
authentication keys that make up the bidimensional one-way chain. Finally,
the IP address of Bob, that will be used to send him the credentials. Once all
the information have been entered, the program checks if they are consistent.
The user identifier should be a value between 0 and 65534, while both the
values of the privilege level and access privilege should be consistent with
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Figure 2.9: addUser() function dialog
respect to the size of the bidimensional one-way chain. If the values are not
consistent an error is reported. Otherwise, the program derives the Alice
authentication key to get the Bob authentication key. If this is not possible
an error is reported. Before contacting the mote, the program sends an
hello message to Bob, that is, to the ip address specified in the dialog. The
missing of an answer by Bob means that he is oﬄine, and the operation is
aborted. Otherwise, Alice generates a cryptographic key randomly. Then,
she composes the addUser() function’s request message in which fits the Bob
user identifier and the cryptographic key just generated. Of course, Alice
and Bob are supposed to be mutually trustworthy. Alice authenticates the
message with her authentication key. Next she encrypts the message with
her symmetric key, and sends it to the mote. After receiving the message,
the mote decrypts it with the symmetric key associated with Alice. If the
message is authentic, and the nonce is fresh, the mote accesses the users
database. Otherwise, the mote sends an error message to Alice. Since two
(different) users cannot have the same user identifier, the mote checks if there
is a member who has the same user identifier specified in the message. In
addition, the mote must check that the maximum number of registered users
has not been reached. If these two checks are negative, then the mote stores
the Bob’s user identifier and the symmetric key. Otherwise, the mote sends
an error message to Alice. Once the mote has finished to add the new user,
the addUser function’s response message is sent to Alice. This message is
authenticated with the same authentication key used in the request message
and it is encrypted with the symmetric key associated with Alice. Alice
receives the message, decrypts it with her symmetric key and verifies the
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authenticity using her authentication key. If the message is authentic and the
nonce is fresh, Alice has to send the new credentials to Bob. Otherwise, the
message is discarded. As explained previously, the communication between
Alice and Bob is via ethernet. Alice and Bob negotiate a symmetric session
key Ks through the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Alice prepares
a message where she enters the Bob credentials and information regarding
the bidimensional one-way chain. Then, Alice encrypts the message using
the key Ks and sends it to Bob. Bob receives the message and decrypts it
with the key Ks. Then, through a dialog, he should decide whether to store
Figure 2.10: Save credentials dialog
the received information or not . If yes, the information are saved in the
file user.bin. In both cases, Bob responds to Alice to inform her that the
credentials has been received.
Remove User The removeUser() function is used to remove an user from
the mote. Let us suppose that Alice wants to remove Bob from the system.
Through a dialog, the application requires Alice to enter the Bob user iden-
Figure 2.11: removeUser() function dialog
tifier. Then, she composes the removeUser function’s request message in
which fits the Bob user identifier. Alice authenticates the message with his
authentication key. Next she encrypts the message with her symmetric key,
and sends it to the mote. The mote receives the message and decrypts it
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with the symmetric key associated with Alice. If the message is authentic,
and the nonce is fresh, the mote accesses the users database. Otherwise,
the mote sends an error message to Alice. The mote checks if there is a
member who has the same user identifier specified in the message. If so,
the mote removes Bob from its users database. Otherwise, the mote sends
an error message to Alice. Once the mote has finished to remove Bob, the
removeUser() function’s response message is sent to Alice. This message is
authenticated with the same authentication key used in the request mes-
sage and is encrypted with the symmetric key associated with Alice. Alice
receives the message, decrypts it with her symmetric key and verifies the
authenticity using her authentication key. If the message is authentic and
the nonce is fresh, Alice reads the outcome of the operation. Otherwise, the
message is discarded. Bob can still send request messages to the mote, but
these are discarded. Furthermore, the system owner can not be removed
from the system.
Start Polling The startPolling() function is used to start the polling. In
this implementation it is polled the light value. Let us suppose that Alice
wants to start the polling. In order to do this, she has to compose the
startPolling() function’s request message. Alice authenticates the message
with her authentication key. Next she encrypts the message with her sym-
metric key, and sends it to the mote. The mote receives the message and
decrypts it with the symmetric key associated with Alice. If the message is
authentic, and the nonce is fresh, the mote starts the polling. Otherwise the
mote sends an error message to Alice. Polling is implemented as a periodic
timer, called sensingTimer. Each time that elapses this time interval, the
mote reads the light value and sends it in broadcast. To start polling means
to start the sensingTimer in periodic mode. Once the mote has started
the sensingTimer, the startPolling() function’s response message is sent to
Alice. This message is authenticated with the same authentication key used
in the request message, and is encrypted with the symmetric key associated
with Alice. Alice receives the message, decrypts it with her symmetric key
and verifies the authenticity using her authentication key. If the message
is authentic and the nonce fresh, Alice reads the outcome of the operation.
Otherwise, the message is discarded. If polling is already active this function
has no effect.
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Stop Polling The stopPolling() function is used to stop the polling. Let
us suppose that Alice wants to stop the polling. She composes the stop-
Polling() function’s request message. Alice authenticates the message with
his authentication key. Next she encrypts the message with her symmetric
key, and sends it to the mote. The mote receives the message and decrypts
it with the symmetric key associated with Alice. If the message is authentic,
and the nonce is fresh, the sensor stops the polling. Otherwise, the mote
sends an error message to Alice. As seen in the startPolling function, the
polling is implemented as a periodic timer, called sensingTimer. To stop
the polling means to stop the sensingTimer. Once the mote has stopped
the sensingTimer, the stopPolling() function’s response message is sent to
Alice. This message is authenticated with the same authentication key used
in the request message and encrypted with the symmetric key associated
with Alice. Alice receives the message, decrypts it with her symmetric key
and verifies the authenticity using her authentication key. If the message is
authentic and the nonce is fresh, Alice reads the outcome of the operation.
Otherwise, the message is discarded. If polling is already off this function
has no effect.
Set Sensing Period The setSensingPeriod() function is used to modify
the value of the sensing period used for polling the light value. The sensing
period is used as parameter to start the sensingTimer. Let us suppose that
Alice wants to change the sensing period. Through a dialog, the application
Figure 2.12: setSensingPeriod() function dialog
requires Alice to enter the new sensing period value in milliseconds. This
value should be a positive interger value, represented on 32 bit. Alice com-
poses the setSensingPeriod() function’s request message, in which fits the
new sensing period value. Alice authenticates the message with her authen-
tication key. Next she encrypts the message with her symmetric key, and
sends it to the mote. The mote receives the message and decrypts it with
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the symmetric key associated with Alice. If the message is authentic, and
the nonce is fresh, the mote saves the received value as sensing period. Oth-
erwise, the mote sends an error message to Alice. Once the mote has saved
the new value, the setSensingPeriod() function’s response message is sent to
Alice. This message is authenticated with the same authentication key used
in the request message and is encrypted with the symmetric key associated
with Alice. Alice receives the message, decrypts it with her symmetric key
and verifies the authenticity using her authentication key. If the message is
authentic and the nonce is fresh, Alice reads the outcome of the operation.
Otherwise, the message is discarded. If the polling was active before per-
forming the function setSensingPeriod() then Alice must rerun the function
startPolling() so that the timer is activated with the new sampling time.
Get Sensing Period The getSensingPeriod() function is used to get the
value of the sensing period used for polling the light value. Let us suppose
that Alice wants to get the sensing period. Alice composes the getSensing-
Period() function’s request message. Alice authenticates the message with
her authentication key. Next she encrypts the message with her symmetric
key, and sends it to the mote. The mote receives the message and decrypts
it with the symmetric key associated with Alice. If the message is authentic,
and the nonce is fresh, the mote composes the getSensingPeriod() function’s
response message with sensing period value. Otherwise, the mote sends an
error message to Alice. The mote sends the response message to Alice. This
message is authenticated with the same authentication key used in the re-
quest message and encrypted with the symmetric key associated with Alice.
Alice receives the message, decrypts it with her symmetric key and verifies
the authenticity using her authentication key. If the message is authentic
and the nonce is fresh, Alice reads the outcome of the operation, and the
sensing period is printed to the screen. Otherwise, the message is discarded.
Get Light Value The getLightValue() function is used for sensing the
light value. Let us suppose that Alice wants to get the light value. Alice
composes the getLightValue() function’s request message. Alice authenti-
cates the message with her authentication key. Next she encrypts the mes-
sage with her symmetric key, and sends it to the mote. The mote receives
the message and decrypts it with the symmetric key associated with Alice.
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If the message is authentic, and the nonce is fresh, the mote reads the light
value and composes the getLightValue() function’s response message with
the sensed value. Otherwise, the sensor sends an error message to Alice.
The mote sends the response message to Alice. This message is authenti-
cated with the same authentication key used in the request message and
encrypted with the symmetric key associated with Alice. Alice receives the
message, decrypts it with her symmetric key and verifies the authenticity
using her authentication key. If the message is authentic and the nonce is
fresh, Alice reads the outcome of the operation, and the light value is printed
to the screen. Otherwise, the message is discarded.
Request Authentication Key The requestAuthenticationKey() is the
only function that does not require interaction with the mote. An au-
thentication key become no longer valid, due to the execution of one of
the functions changeSeed(), replacePrimaryFunction() or replaceSecondary-
Function(). If an user has the outdated authentication key wi,j , the updated
key w′i,j can be obtained through the requestAuthenticationKey() function.
w′i,j has a different value than wi,j , but it provides the same access privilege.
Let us suppose that the Bob’s authentication key wi,j is no longer valid,
and, also, let us suppose that Bob decides to request the new authentication
key w′i,j to Alice. Through a dialog, the application requires Bob to enter
Figure 2.13: requestAuthenticationKey() function dialog
the Alice’s ip address. As explained previously, the communication between
Alice and Bob is via TCP/IP. Alice and Bob negotiate a symmetric session
key Ks through the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Bob prepares a
message where the key indentifier kid of his authentication key wi,j is en-
tered. Then, Bob encrypts the message using the key Ks and sends it to
Alice. Alice receives the message and decrypts it with the key Ks. Then,
through a dialog, she should decide whether or not to accept Bob’s request.
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Figure 2.14: requestAuthenticationKey() accepting dialog
If Alice decides to accept the request, the key derivation mechanism is used
to obtain the authentication key requested from Bob. If Alice agrees to meet
Bob’s request, the key identifier kid indicated in the message is used to see if
it is able or not to derive the requested authentication key. For this reason,
it is a good idea to ask the key to the system owner, which, by definition, can
derive all the authentication keys that make up the bidimensional one-way
chain. If Alice is not able to obtain the authentication key requested from
Bob, or if she does not agree to meet the Bob request, she responds with an
error message. Otherwise, Alice derives its authentication key obtaining the
key w′i,j . Once Alice has obtained the key w′i,j , the requestAuthentication-
Key response message is prepared, in which the new key is inserted. Then,
Alice encrypts the message using the key Ks, and sends it to Bob. Bob
receives the message and decrypts it with the key Ks. If no errors occurred,
Bob saves the authentication key in the file user.bin.
2.3.10 Message Format
This section shows the format and size of messages exchanged between mote
and users. The size of messages exchanged on TinyOS is static and deter-
mined in the implementation phase. For this reason, they have been defined
three formats of messages, with the aim of minimizing the overhead. The
three message formats are:
• PollingMsg
• StdMsg32
• StdMsg48
PollingMsg This kind of message is used for sending the values obtained
when polling is active.
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typede f n x s t r u c t Pol l ingMsg {
nx u in t16 t u s e r i d ;
nx u in t16 t va lue ;
} Poll ingMsg ;
The user id field is used to specify the identifier of the message sender. The
value field contains the value to be transmitted.
StdMsg32 This type of message is used by users to make requests to the
mote, and it is also used by the mote to respond to users.
typede f n x s t r u c t StdMsg32 {
nx u in t16 t u s e r i d ;
n x u i n t 8 t c i p h e r t e x t [ 3 2 ] ;
} StdMsg32 ;
The user id field is used to specify the identifier of the message sender. It
represents the message header, and it is send in plaintext. The ciphertext
field is an array that contains the parameters used by the functions, such as
nonces, MAC, function identifier, etc. It represents the message body, and
it is encrypted. The parameters contained in this field vary according to the
function and whether it is a request or a response.
StdMsg48 This type of message is used by users to make requests to the
mote, and it is also used by the mote to respond to users.
typede f n x s t r u c t StdMsg48 {
nx u in t16 t u s e r i d ;
n x u i n t 8 t c i p h e r t e x t [ 4 8 ] ;
} StdMsg48 ;
For this message format are valid all the considerations made for StdMsg32.
The only difference is that you can send messages of larger size.
Let us see the contents of the ciphertext field according to the require-
ments of the functions. Request messages are sent from user to mote, while
response messages are sent from mote to user.
Change Seed Request The table 2.3 shows the content of the change-
Seed() function’s request message.
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Table 2.3: Change Seed Request
0-15 16 17-19 20 21-36
t functionId nonce kid seed
Plaintext = 37 byte
This message is send as StdMsg48.
Change Seed Response The table 2.4 shows the content of the change-
Seed() function’s response message.
Table 2.4: Change Seed Response
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce errno
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Replace Primary Function Request The table 2.5 shows the content
of the replacePrimaryFunction() function’s request message.
Table 2.5: Replace Primary Function Request
0-15 16 17-19 20 21
t functionId nonce kid pck
Plaintext = 22 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Replace Primary Function Response The table 2.6 shows the content
of the replacePrimaryFunction() function’s response message.
Table 2.6: Replace Primary Function Response
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce errno
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
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Replace Secondary Function Request The table 2.7 shows the content
of the replaceSecondaryFunction() function’s request message.
Table 2.7: Replace Secondary Function Request
0-15 16 17-19 20 21 22
t functionId nonce kid privilegeLevel sck
Plaintext = 23 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Replace Secondary Function Response The table 2.8 shows the con-
tent of the replaceSecondaryFunction() function’s response message.
Table 2.8: Replace Secondary Function Response
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce errno
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Change Privilege Request The table 2.9 shows the content of the changePriv-
ilege() function’s request message.
Table 2.9: Change Privilege Request
0-15 16 17-19 20 21 22-23
t functionId nonce kid privilegeLevel decimalValue
Plaintext = 24 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Change Privilege Response The table 2.10 shows the content of the
changePrivilege() function’s response message.
Plaintext = 22 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
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Table 2.10: Change Privilege Response
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce errno
Table 2.11: Get Users List Request
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce kid
Get Users List Request The table 2.11 shows the content of the ge-
tUsersList() function’s request message.
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Get Users List Response The table 2.12 shows the content of the ge-
tUsersList() function’s response message.
Table 2.12: Get Users List Response
0-15 16 17-19 20 21 22-41
t functionId nonce errno usersNum usersIds
Plaintext = 42 byte
This message is send as StdMsg48.
Add User Request The table 2.13 shows the content of the addUser()
function’s request message.
Table 2.13: Add User Request
0-15 16 17-19 20 21 22-37
t functionId nonce kid userId symmetricKey
Plaintext = 38 byte
This message is send as StdMsg48.
Add User Response The table 2.14 shows the content of the addUser()
function’s response message.
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Table 2.14: Add User Response
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce errno
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Remove User Request The table 2.15 shows the content of the re-
moveUser() function’s request message.
Table 2.15: Remove User Request
0-15 16 17-19 20 21-22
t functionId nonce kid userId
Plaintext = 23 byte
This message is send as StdMsg48.
Remove User Response The table 2.16 shows the content of the re-
moveUser() function’s response message.
Table 2.16: Remove User Response
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce errno
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Start Polling Request The table 2.17 shows the content of the start-
Polling() function’s request message.
Table 2.17: Start Polling Request
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce kid
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
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Start Polling Response The table 2.18 shows the content of the start-
Polling() function’s response message.
Table 2.18: Start Polling Response
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce errno
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Stop Polling Request The table 2.19 shows the content of the stop-
Polling() function’s request message.
Table 2.19: Stop Polling Request
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce kid
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Stop Polling Response The table 2.20 shows the content of the stop-
Polling() function’s response message.
Table 2.20: Stop Polling Response
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce errno
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Set Sampling Time Request The table 2.21 shows the content of the
setSamplingTime() function’s request message.
Plaintext = 25 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
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Table 2.21: Set Sampling Time Request
0-15 16 17-19 20 21-24
t functionId nonce kid samplingPeriod
Table 2.22: Set Sampling Time Response
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce errno
Set Sampling Time Response The table shows the content of the set-
SamplingTime() function’s response message.
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Get Sampling Time Request The table 2.23 shows the content of the
getSamplingTime() function’s request message.
Table 2.23: Get Sampling Time Request
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce kid
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Get Sampling Time Response The table 2.24 shows the content of the
getSamplingTime() function’s response message.
Table 2.24: Get Sampling Time Response
0-15 16 17-19 20 21-24
t functionId nonce errno samplingPeriod
Plaintext = 25 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Get Light Value Request The table 2.25 shows the content of the get-
LightValue() function’s request message.
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Table 2.25: Get Light Value Request
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce kid
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Get Light Value Response The table 2.26 shows the content of the
getLightValue() function’s response message.
Table 2.26: Get Light Value Response
0-15 16 17-19 20 21-22
t functionId nonce errno lightValue
Plaintext = 23 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Error Message The table shows the content of the error message sent by
the mote when an error occurs.
Table 2.27: Error Message
0-15 16 17-19 20
t functionId nonce errno
Plaintext = 21 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
2.3.11 Client Side Application
The graphical interface of the client side application is shown in the figure
2.15. This application is mainly implemented in Java. Cryptographic func-
tions are implemented in C and make use of the library openSSL. Through
the use of the Java Native Interface (JNI) these functions can be called from
Java code. To facilitate the launch of the application an executable script
called moteController.sh is used. Before the execution of the script, both
access rights to read and write should be granted to the serial port where
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Figure 2.15: Client side application GUI
the mote, that is used as an antenna, is connected. When the application
is launched, the content of the user.bin file is loaded and is shown on the
screen. The absence of the file means that the user has not been added to
the system yet.
The top of the interface allows the user to choose between direct and
indirect communication. In case of direct communication the serial port on
which the mote is connected must be specified. While, in case of indirect
communication the ip address of the intermediate node must be specified.
At this point, after pushing the button Start, the application is able to both
send and receive messages to the mote. After pressing the Start button
the buttons on the right of the interface are activated. Each button on the
left side of the interface corresponds to every one of the functions described
in section 2.3.9. The Clear button, conversely, has the only function of
clearing the text area. In case the file user.bin is not present, the buttons
on the left side of the interface are not activated until the user does not
receive the credentials to interact with the mote. The text area is used to
display on the screen all the information generated from the execution of
the application. It is possible to easily change the type of communication
(direct/indirect) by checking the related checkbox, and by pressing the Start
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button again. The application constantly listens to TCP messages with
which receives hello messages, the credentials to interact with the mote,
requests for authentication keys and the replies sent by the intermediate
node.
2.3.12 File user.bin Content
The content of the file user.bin is reported in table 2.28. The first 4 entries
Table 2.28: user.bin content
Field Size (byte)
user identifier 1
kid 1
symmetric key 16
authentication key 16
privilege levels number 1
access privileges number 1
primary chain key (pck) 1
secondary chain keys (scki) 1 * privilege levels number
privilege array 2 * privilege levels number
are used by the user for interacting with the mote. The remaining fields are
used by the user for the key derivation mechanism. It is important to note
that a user must never reveal the file user.bin to any other user.
2.4 Performance Evaluation
The execution time of the functionalities provided by the mote has been
measured from the client side using the Java library java.util.Date. The
Date object provides the getTime() method which returns the number of
milliseconds since January 1, 1970, 00:00:00 GMT. Using the getTime()
method, the current time is taken at the beginning and at the end of the
function in question. Then, the execution time is calculated as the differ-
ence between the two time instants. The value obtained is then printed on
the GUI. To make this analysis possible, the original application should be
slightly modified by adding the instructions to get the time instants. Each
function foresees a part of running on the mote and a processing part on
the computer of the user. The mote used is the Tmote Sky whose specifi-
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cations are given in the datasheet [5]. The mote was powered through the
computer’s USB port. While the computers used to test the application has
these features:
• Operating System: Ubuntu 14.04 (trusty)
• Kernel: 3.13.0-68-generic
• CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU 920 @ 2.67GHz
• RAM: 6GB
• Graphic Card: Radeon HD7850 2GB GDDR5
Change Seed In the figure 2.16 is shown the performance graph of the
function changeSeed().
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Figure 2.16: changeSeed() execution time
The changeSeed() function has an average execution time of 1350 mil-
liseconds, with a variance of 31 square milliseconds.
Replace Primary Function In the figure 2.17 is shown the performance
graph of the function replacePrimaryFunction().
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Figure 2.17: replacePrimaryFunction() execution time
The replacePrimaryFunction() function has an average execution time
of 1344 milliseconds, with a variance of 36 square milliseconds.
Replace Secondary Function In the figure 2.18 is shown the perfor-
mance graph of the function replaceSecondaryFunction().
µ = 635630 640
1
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.2
Time(ms)
ϕµ,θ2(Time)
Figure 2.18: replaceSecondaryFunction() execution time
The replaceSecondaryFunction() function has an average execution time
of 635 milliseconds, with a variance of 16 square milliseconds. To measure
the execution time of this function, the longest secondary chain has been
chosen, namely the chain associated with privilege level lv0.
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Change Privilege In the figure 2.19 is shown the performance graph of
the function changePrivilege().
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Figure 2.19: changePrivilege() execution time
The changePrivilege() function has an average execution time of 58 mil-
liseconds, with a variance of 36 square milliseconds.
Get Users List In the figure 2.20 is shown the performance graph of the
function getUserList().
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Figure 2.20: getUserList() execution time
The getUserList() function has an average execution time of 67 millisec-
onds, with a variance of 11 square milliseconds.
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Add User In the figure 2.21 is shown the performance graph of the func-
tion addUser().
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Figure 2.21: addUser() execution time
The addUser() function has an average execution time of 67 milliseconds,
with a variance of 12 square milliseconds.
Remove User In the figure 2.22 is shown the performance graph of the
function removeUser().
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Figure 2.22: removeUser() execution time
The removeUser() function has an average execution time of 58 millisec-
onds, with a variance of 13 square milliseconds.
CHAPTER 2. PASSWORD SYSTEM 54
Stop Polling In the figure 2.23 is shown the performance graph of the
function stopPolling().
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Figure 2.23: stopPolling() execution time
The stopPolling() function has an average execution time of 57 millisec-
onds, with a variance of 18 square milliseconds.
Start Polling In the figure 2.24 is shown the performance graph of the
function startPolling().
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Figure 2.24: startPolling() execution time
The startPolling() function has an average execution time of 57 millisec-
onds, with a variance of 16 square milliseconds.
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Set Sampling Time In the figure 2.25 is shown the performance graph
of the function setSamplingTime().
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Figure 2.25: setSamplingTime()execution time
The setSamplingTime() function has an average execution time of 57
milliseconds, with a variance of 22 square milliseconds.
Get Sampling Time In the figure 2.26 is shown the performance graph
of the function getSamplingTime().
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Figure 2.26: getSamplingTime() execution time
The getSamplingTime() function has an average execution time of 58
milliseconds, with a variance of 24 square milliseconds.
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Get Light Value In the figure 2.27 is shown the performance graph of
the function getLightValue().
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Figure 2.27: getLightValue() execution time
The getLightValue() function has an average execution time of 75 mil-
liseconds, with a variance of 17 square milliseconds.
Chapter 3
Distributed Storage
Protection
3.1 Overview
The purpose of this work is to realise an application consisting in a wireless
sensor network (WSN) for the monitoring of a generic environmental pa-
rameter. The network’s nodes are organized in a hierarchical structure on
three levels. The nodes of the lowest level belong to a cluster, and they are
concerned with measuring the environmental parameter. The intermediate
level is formed by the cluster head. Indeed, each cluster has a leader node
that coordinates the nodes of the lowest level. The cluster head is responsi-
ble for receiving the data from the lower nodes and calculate the aggregate
value, according to an aggregate function. The highest level is formed by the
sink node. This is responsible for receiving and storing the values obtained
from the intermediate node. The special feature of this application is the
way in which the nodes exchange data. Each node has a primary memory
that can be divided into segments. A node can access a remote segment
allocated in the primary memory of another node only if it has the access
right for that segment. Therefore, the data exchange in the network occours
by writing/reading directly in the primary memory of the other node. The
conversations take place according to a protocol that ensures integrity, con-
fidentiality and protection from replay attacks. This chapter describes the
theoretical model of the distributed storage protection, describes the im-
plementation of the application based on the theoretical model, and finally
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reports the performance analysis.
3.2 Protection Model
The protection model used to implement this application is based on the
work described in the article [6] which is summarized in this section.
The main components of the protection model are:
• Segments
• Gates
• Protection Primitives
3.2.1 Segment
A segment S is specified by pair S = (M,C) where variable M is the identi-
fier of the node storing S, while variable C is the local identifier of S. Node
M has a table, which is called the segment table STM. In this table the
associations of local segment identifiers are included together with the cor-
responding area in the primary memory of node M. This memory area is
located by the starting address B in the primary memory of this segment,
and by the segment length L. This is possibile because a segment is defined
as a contiguous memory area. Therefore, each segment table entry contains
the segment identifier C, the starting address B, and the segment lenght L.
3.2.2 Gates
A gate G is a pair G = (M,T ) which refers to segment S = (M,C) in node
M. T is a protection field, identified by pair T = (C, p), that includes the
segment local identifier C and a password p. Every node M has a set PM of
three passwords, PM = {pR, pW , pRW }. Each password p corresponds to an
access right for the segments in M. Password pR corresponds to access right
read, password pW corresponds to access right write, and password pRW
corresponds to access right read and write. If a match exists between p and
one of the passwords in PM , then the gate G grants the corresponding access
right for segment S. Quantity M of gate G is in plaintext, whereas quantity T
is encrypted by using a symmetric-key cipher and a cryptographic key, called
the local key lkM, which is associated with node M. The only purpose of lkM
CHAPTER 3. DISTRIBUTED STORAGE PROTECTION 59
is the encryption/decryption of the gates in M. Therefore, this local key is
kept within node M, avoiding whichever transmission or revelation to other
nodes. Even passwords p belonging to the set PM are never transmitted
or revealed by node M to any other node. Figure 3.1 explains how gate
Figure 3.1: Gate generation, numbers specifying the fields size in byte
G = (M,T ) is generated. G grants access right AR for segment S = (M,C).
AR represent one possible access right. pAR indicate the password in PM
that corresponds to access right AR. The protection field T is obtained
by encrypting the quantity formed by both the segment identifier C and
password pAR. Local key lkM is used as cryptographic key. Therefore, since
gate generation requires local key lkM to be known, a gate referencing a
segment in node M can be assembled in this node only. Figure 3.2 illustrates
how gate G is converted into plaintext by reverse transformation. The
protection field T is decrypted using the local key lkM as cryptographic
key. The result of the decryption are the segment identifier C and password
pAR. Password pAR is compared with the password belonging to the set
PM. If a match exists between the password pAR and one of passwords in
PM, then the gate G is valid and grants access right AR for the segment
having segment identifier C. Hence, since the decryption process uses the
local key lkM of this node, a gate referencing a segment in node M can only
be disassembled in M itself.
3.2.3 Protection Primitives
The protection primitives can be divided into two types. All those pro-
tection primitives whose execution is completely confined to the node who
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Figure 3.2: Gate Validation
performed it, as the newSegment(), belong to the first type. This type of
protection primitives are used to allocate and delete segments. While the
other type of protection primitives are those that produce message exchange
between nodes of the network, such as the readSegment(). This type of pro-
tection primitives are used to access remote segments. A message consists
of a header in plaintext and a body encrypted using a symmetric-key ci-
pher. Obviously, the messages is successful if and only if the two nodes,
for example node M and node N, share the same cryptographic key. Each
cryptographic key used for messages exchanging has a name that identifies
it uniquely. This name is specified in the message header. Whenever a node
M receives a message, it uses the key name to choose the correct encryption
key to decrypt the message body. In the next few paragraphs is described
the protection primitives behavior.
Allocating and Deleting Segments
A node M has free access to primary memory to perform any task, regardless
of the segments. In fact, it does not need any form of authorization to access
his primary memory. The protection mechanism proposed by [6] is used to
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access a remote segment. A remote segment is a segment allocated in the
primary memory of another node. A node N, in order to access a remote
segment S in node M, should have a gate G granting access right AR for the
segment S in M. The operations permitted on a remote segment are only
the reading of the segment contents and the replacement of these contents.
A node M that wants to allocate a new segment S = (M,C) executes the
protection primitive newSegment(). This primitive takes as parameters the
base B and the length L of the new segment. The result of this primitive is
the identifier C of the new segment.
C = newSegment(B,L)
The information of the new segment are inserted into the segment table
STM. A node M that wants to create a gate G executes the protection
primitive newGate(). This primitive takes as parameters the segment iden-
tifier C and the access right AR.
G = newGate(C,AR)
The result of this primitive is the gate G which grants access right AR
for the segment S = (M,C). The access right AR should be read, write,
or both. The primitive newGate() can only generate gate for segments al-
located in the primary memory of the current node. A node M that wants
to delete a segment S = (M,C) executes the protection primitive delete-
Segment(). This primitive takes as parameter the segment identifier C of
segment S.
deleteSegment(C)
The result is the deletion of the entry reserved for the segment S from the
segment table STM. It is important to emphasize that this primitive does
not delete the contents of the primary memory which the S segment refers.
Accessing Remote Segments
The protection primititives readSegment() and writeSegment() are used to
access a remote segment. Let us suppose that a node M has a valid gate G =
(N,T ) that references segment S = (N,C) stored in node N. Furthermore,
the gate G specifies a password p associated to one of the access right
(R,W,RW ). Let us see the execution of these protection primitives, as
decribed in [6].
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readSegment() A node M, through the execution of the protection primi-
tive readSegment(k, G, addr) copies the contents of segment S stored in node
N into a memory area that starts at address addr of the primary memory
of M. Argument k is the cryptographic key that is used for communication
between M and N. If the password p specified in gate G matches password
pR or pRW of node N, then the execution of the protection primitive read-
Segment() is successful.
Execution of this primitive is as follows:
1. Node M sends a nonce request message to node N.
2. Node N generates a random number EN to be used as a nonce, and
sends it back to node M.
3. Node M composes a message in which fits the gate G, the received
nonce EN and a nonce EM randomly generated by M. This message is
encrypted using the encryption key k, and it is sended to node N.
4. Node N decrypts the received message using the key k. Then, it verifies
if the received nonce EN is the same generated in step 2. Next, node N
uses its own local key lkN to decrypt the protection field T of gate G
into pair (C, p) (see Fig. 3.2). Quantity p is compared with passwords
pR and pRW; if a match is found, gate G is valid.
5. If nonce validation fails, or gate validation fails, node N sends a mes-
sage including nonce EM and a negative reply to node M. The execution
of readSegment() is considered as failed. Otherwise:
6. Node N composes a message in which fits the nonce EM, the contents
of segment S and a positive reply. This message is encrypted using
the encryption key k, and it is sended to node M.
7. Node M decrypts the received message using the key k. Then, it
verifies if the received nonce EM is the same generated in step 3. If
the nonce is valid, M stores the contents of segment S into a memory
area of length L starting at address addr of its own primary memory.
writeSegment() A node M, through the execution of the protection prim-
itive writeSegment(k, G, addr) copies the contents of a memory area that
starts at address addr of its primary memory into segment S stored in node
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N. Argument k is the cryptographic key that is used for communication
between M and N. If the password p specified in gate G matches password
pW or pRW of node N, then the execution of the protection primitive write-
Segment() is successful.
Execution of this primitive is as follows:
1. Node M sends a nonce request message to node N.
2. Node N generates a random number EN to be used as a nonce, and
sends it back to node M.
3. Node M composes a message in which fits the gate G, the received
nonce EN, a nonce EM randomly generated by M, and the contents a
of a memory area of length L that starts at address addr of the primary
memory of M. This message is encrypted using the encryption key k,
and it is sended to node N.
4. Node N decrypts the received message using the key k. Then, it verifies
if the received nonce EN is the same generated in step 2. Next, node N
uses its own local key lkN to decrypt the protection field T of gate G
into pair (C, p) (see Fig. 3.2). Quantity p is compared with passwords
pR and pRW; if a match is found, gate G is valid.
5. If nonce validation fails, or gate validation fails, node N sends a mes-
sage including nonce EM and a negative reply to node M. The execution
of readSegment() is considered as failed. Otherwise:
6. Node N replaces the contents of segment S with quantity a. Then, it
composes a message in which fits the nonce EM and a positive reply.
This message is encrypted using the encryption key k, and it is sended
to node M.
7. Node M decrypts the received message using the key k. Then, it
verifies if the received nonce EM is the same generated in step 3.
The use of nonces has the aim prevent replay attacks. The name of the
cryptographic key k is specified in plaintext in the message header. If a
node does not know the key k, then the protection primitive terminates
with failure.
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3.2.4 Cryptographic Keys
The protection system uses three types of cryptographic keys:
• Local Keys
• Nonlocal Keys
• Application Keys
Local Keys A local key is used in each node to encrypt the gate’s protec-
tion field, during the execution of the protection primitive newGate(), and
also to decrypt the gate’s protection field during the gate validation proce-
dure. This key has no other use and it is never transmitted to other nodes.
A node M, which has a gate G generated by node N, is not able to decipher
the content of G, without the local key lkN of node N. If this were possible,
node M could alter the field of gate G which specifies the segment identifier.
In this way node M can access memory segments of node N, where M is not
entitled to access.
Nonlocal Keys Nonlocal keys are used for communication between a
node and its application server. Each node shares a different nonlocal key
with the application server. The member uses this nonlocal key to execute
the protection primitive readSegment() and read the new application key
from the key reporitory every time a rekey takes place. The application
key is not suitable for this purpose. Indeed, if the new application key is
transmitted in a message encrypted with the old application key, a node
that has just been expelled from the application would be able to decipher
the message and obtain the new key.
Application Keys The application key is used for messages exchanging
between nodes belonging to the same application. If two nodes belonging to
the same application A exchange a message encrypted with the application
key, then all the other nodes belonging to A are able to decrypt the message.
This is not a security hole, as the members of the same application are
considered mutually trustworthy.
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3.2.5 Key Management
Nodes belonging to the same application encrypt messages using the ap-
plication key. The application server is responsible for management and
dissemination of application key. His task is to replace the application key
when needed. For each node belonging to the application, the application
server reserves a special segment in its primary memory, called the key repos-
itory. Each member holds a gate granting access right R for its own key
repository. When the application key has to be replaced the application
server calculates the new value of the key and the new key name. Next,
the application server copies these two pieces of information in each repos-
itory allocated in its primary memory. Once this operation is finished, the
application server sends the rekey message to each node belonging to the
application. A node, once receiving the rekey message, executes the protec-
tion primitive readSegment() for reading the new application key in its key
repository. This conversation between the node and the application server
is encrypted with the nonlocal key shared among them.
Application key must be replaced several times during the life of the
application. In the periodic rekeing approach, keys are renewed at regular
intervals. This approach is intended to provide resistance to attacks, failures,
and maintain secrecy. The periodic approach as itself is not enough. Indeed,
a rekey is needed when a new node joins the application, and when a node
leaves the application. It is necessary to make a rekey when a new node
joins the application, because it could have collected the messages passed
through the network so far. Knowing the application key, the new node
would be able to decrypt the content of these messages. To avoid malicious
behavior of this kind, when a node joins the application, the application
server calculates a new application key and sends the rekey message to all
nodes that are members of the application. With this simple strategy, a node
that has just joined the application can not decrypt previous messages. The
same applies when a node leaves the application. In this case, to prevent the
node that has left the application to decrypt the content of the messages that
are sent over the network, the application server calculates a new application
key. After calculating a new application key, the application server copies
the key in the key repositories allocated to the nodes that are part of the
application. When a node leaves the application, its key repository on the
application server is deleted. This means that a node that has left the
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application is not able to obtain the new application key. Each application
key has a name and a value. The value is an array of 16 bytes, that the
application server generates randomly each time that is needed to rekey.
The name of the application key is a 32 bit number with this format: The
Table 3.1: Application key name
0-15 16-31
key counter application name
key counter is a 16-bit value initialized to zero and is incremented each time
a new application key is calculated. The size of 16 bits allows the rekey
for 65536 times. The application name is the binary representation of the
name of the application server. To be noted, there is only one application
server for each application. The application name can be used by a node to
determine if its application key is still valid.
Let us suppose that nodes M and N are members of the same application
A. Node M sends a message encrypted with the application key KA to node
N. Every message consists of a header in plaintext and a body in ciphertext;
the header contains the name of the key that was used to encrypt the body.
On receiving the message from M, node N compares the name of the applica-
tion key used to encrypt the message, specified in the message header, with
the name of its own application key K ′A. If the application key name is the
same, then the message can be decrypted correctly. Otherwise the node N
has to compare the name of key KA indicated in the received message with
its own key K ′A. If the application name is the same, then node N compares
the key counter of the two keys. If the key counter of key K ′A, is lesser than
the key counter of key KA, then the application key of node N is outdated.
Otherwise it is the node M to have an outdated application key. In the
first case, node N picks up the new application key from his key repository
performing a readSegment() towards the application server. In the second
case, the node N sends to the node M a message encrypted with the valid
application key K ′A, so that the node M can understand that its application
key is outdated. It can be concluded that this rekey mechanism is able to
cope with losses of rekey messages. This feature is especially important for
reliable application rekeying in an unreliable network environment.
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3.3 Implementation
In this section we will see a possible implementation of the system presented
in the above mentioned scenario. This section will describe the structure,
the design choices, algorithms and solutions adopted during the construction
of the system. The motes used in this work are equipped with TinyOS, and
the programming language used is nesC.
3.3.1 WSN Architecture
Figure 3.3: System Architecture
From Figure 3.3 we can notice that the WSN has a hierarchical topology,
consisting of four types of nodes:
• Application Server
• Sink
• Gathering Node
• Sensing Node
Application Server The application server is responsible for generating
and distributing the application key. A segment is allocated to each node
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that participates in the application. Each segment has a size of 20 bytes,
which corresponds to the size of the application key, large 16 bytes, plus the
name of the application key, large 4 bytes. The application server calculates
a new application key to the occurrence of one of the three events listed:
• A new node join the application
• A node leave the application
• Expiry of the period of rekeying
The application key and its name, are copied in the segments allocated
to the nodes that are part of the application. The application server signals
the availability of a new application key by sending a rekey message to each
node. A node that has a valid gate can get the application key at any time,
through the protection primitive readSegment().
Each node that wants to communicate with the application server must
shares with it a cryptographic key, called nonlocal key. Indeed, commu-
nication between any node and application server, is encrypted with an
encryption key different from the application key.
Sink The sink node collects information from gathering node. These in-
formation are the result of the aggregation of the values obtained from the
sensing nodes.
Gathering Node The gathering node is responsible for collecting, aggre-
gating and forwarding to the sink the data collected by the sensing nodes.
It allocates a segment of four bytes for each sensing node belonging to its
cluster. Periodically sends a broadcast message through which signals to
sensing nodes that must perform a reading and communicate the result.
Once received readings by sensing node, the gathering node applies an ag-
gregate function, such as MAX, MIN, etc. The result of the aggregation is
written on the primary memory of the sink through the protection primitive
writeSegment().
Sensing Node The sensing nodes are responsible for taking measure-
ments, and write the result in the primary memory of gathering node through
the protection primitive writeSegment().
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3.3.2 Functions Implementation
This section describes how the protection primitives and the functions that
make use of them were implemented.
New Segment The protection primitive newSegment() is used to allocate
a new segment in the primary memory of the current node. A generic node
N allocates a new segment every time it receives a join request. Therefore,
allocation of a new segment is done only on demand. Furthermore, a generic
node N allocates only one segment for every other node. This means that
if node N receives more than a join request from node M, only the first join
request involves the allocation of a segment. A segment is implemented as
a data structure:
typede f s t r u c t SegmentTableEntry {
u i n t 3 2 t id ;
u i n t 1 6 t nodeId ;
u i n t 1 6 t o f f s e t ;
u i n t 1 6 t l ength ;
bool v a l i d ;
} SegmentTableEntry ;
A segment S is uniquely identified by the identifier id. The id field corre-
sponds to the segment identifier C used in the theoretical model. The offset
field specifies the starting address of segment S in primary memory, while
the length field specifies the length of the segment S. Field nodeId specifies
the node identifier for which was allocated the segment S. Finally, the valid
field specifies if that segment is used or not. Each node N has a segment
table called STN , which is implemented as an array of SegmentTableEntry
objects. The size of the table STN depends on the node type. For example,
the application server must be able to allocate a number of segments equals
to the number of nodes that make up the application, itself excluded. The
table STN is initialized during the booting phase. The initialization consists
in setting the valid field to false for all the segments in the table STN . The
protection primitive newSegment(), therefore, needs three parameters:
• Starting address
• Segment length
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• Node identifier
The protection primitive newSegment() must carry out some simple checks.
First, it must check if the table STN is not at the storing limit. This can
only happen if the table STN has not been correctly dimensioned. Second,
it must check if the starting address plus the length of the segment does not
exceed the size of primary memory. Third, it must check whether the table
STN has already a segment associated with the node identifier specified as
a parameter. If these checks has been successful, the protection primitive
newSegment() puts the information of the new segment in the first free
position of the table STN . Field id takes the value of the segment counter.
The segment counter is just a counter that is initialized to zero during the
booting phase, and it is incremented each time a new segment is allocated.
The valid field is set to true. The result of newSegment() is the segment
identifier of the segment S just created. If an error occurs, the function ends
without allocating any segment.
Following is a deeper discussion of the segment size. Two types of seg-
ment of different length are used in the implementation of this system. The
first type of segment is the key repository. The key repository is allocated
only by the application server and it is used to store the name and the value
of the application key. The key repository has a size of 20 bytes. The other
type of segment is used for exchanging the measured data, and can be allo-
cated from all the other types of nodes (sink, gathering node, sensing node).
This segment has a size of 4 bytes.
A further explanation deserves to be made concerning the starting ad-
dress of a segment. When a new segment S is allocated, its starting address
in primary memory is set with the offset of the primary memory. This offset
is initialized during the booting phase with the first free memory address of
primary memory. This offset is then incremented with the size of each new
segment created.
Delete Segment The protection primitive deleteSegment() is used to
delete a segment from the current node. A generic node N delete a seg-
ment every time it receives a leave request. Therefore, deletion of a segment
is done only on demand. As seen before segment is implemented as a data
structure:
typede f s t r u c t SegmentTableEntry {
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u i n t 3 2 t id ;
u i n t 1 6 t nodeId ;
u i n t 1 6 t o f f s e t ;
u i n t 1 6 t l ength ;
bool v a l i d ;
} SegmentTableEntry ;
A segment S is uniquely identified by the identifier id. The protection
primitive deleteSegment(), therefore, needs only the segment identifier. The
protection primitive deleteSegment() must carry out a simple check. It must
check whether the table STN has a segment with the segment identifier
specified as a parameter. If this check has been successful, the protection
primitive deleteSegment() set the valid field of the segment in question to
false. It is important to emphasize that the deletion of a segment has no
effect on the primary memory contents.
New Gate The protection primitive newGate() is used to create a gate.
A gate G is a fixed length code, which grants access right AR for certain
segment S. A generic node N creates a gate every time it receives a join
request. Therefore, creating a gate is done only on demand. A gate is im-
plemented as an array having a size of 20 bytes. The two least significant
bytes of this array are representative of the identifier of the current node
N where the protection primitive is performed, and they are in plaintext.
While the remaining eighteen bytes are representative of the so-called protec-
tion field, which is encrypted using a symmetric-key cipher. The protection
field includes the identifier C of the local segment S, and a password pAR
corresponding to one of the access right (R,W,RW ). Each node has a set
of passwords PN . Each password belonging to the set PN corresponds to
a different access right (R,W,RW ). So, in this case, the set PN is formed
by three different passwords. Therefore, the protection primitive newGate()
needs two parameters:
• Segment identifier C
• Access right AR
In this study it has been supposed that node N executes the protection
primitive newGate() for creating a gate G that specifies access right AR for
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Table 3.2: Gate fields
0-1 2-3 4-19
N C pAR
the segment S whose local identifier is C. First, node N copies its identifier
in the first two bytes of gate G. In TinyOS the node identifier is given by the
value of the variable TOS_NODE_ID, 16 bit large. As it has been said before,
this amount is in plaintext, so no further elaborations are needed. The
next step is to create the protection field. The segment identifier C, which
is passed as a parameter, is copied in the first two bytes of the protection
field. While the password corresponding to access right AR is copied in
the remaining 16 bytes. As said previously, the protection field must be
encrypted using a symmetric-key cipher. The algorithm used to encrypt the
gate is AES-128 in CTS mode of encryption [7]. CTS mode of encryption
makes it possible to avoid the padding introduced by a standard block cipher
when the size of the plaintext is not a multiple of the block size. The
protection field is 18 byte large and this means that using a block cipher
such AES-128 in CBC mode of encryption would produce a ciphertext of 32
bytes. For this reason AES-128 in CTS mode of encryption is used.
The cryptographic key used to encrypt the protection field is the local
key lkN. This key is used by node N only to encrypt/decrypt the gate, and it
is never transmitted to other nodes. Consequently, a generic node X cannot
create a gate that refers to a remote segment S allocated to another node
Y without knowing his key local lkY. The result of protection primitive
newGate() is the gate G just created.
Join The join() function is not a protection primitive, but makes use of
newSegment() and newGate(). A node joins the application when it sends
the join request to the application server. Let us assume that node M wants
to join the application A. Node M starts the communication protocol send-
ing the nonce request to the application server. If the application server
is free, it generates a nonce and it sends the nonce response to node M,
otherwise the request is discarded. After node M receives the nonce re-
sponse, it composes the join() function’s request message. Then, node M
encrypts the message using its own nonlocalkey and sends it to the appli-
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cation server. The nonlocalkey is identified by a specific key name, such
as KnlkM . This key name is specified in plaintext in the message header.
The application server receives the message, then it selects the nonlocalkey
identified by the key name KnlkM and, finally, it decrypts the message. The
application server computes the CBC-MAC of the received message. If the
result is equal to the MAC code linked in the message, then the message has
not been altered. Otherwise, the application server discards the message.
In case of a join request, there is no gate to be validated. The gate is the
result of a successful join request. If the integrity check is successful, the
application server checks whether the nonce that has been sent to the node
M in the second step of the communication protocol is the same as the one
indicated in the join() function’s request message. This control is necessary
to prevent replay attacks. If the nonces do not match, application server
sends an error message to node M. Otherwise, application server accepts
the join request. The first step is to allocate a segment 20 bytes long in the
the application server primary memory. This segment represents the key
repository. Application server inspects its segment table STAS in order to
check whether there is a segment already allocated to node M. In fact, each
node can have at most one key repository. If the research fails, application
server allocates a new segment S starting from the first free position of the
primary memory. A segment is characterized by many parts: a segment
identifier, an offset representing the starting address of this segment in the
primary memory, the segment length in bytes, and the node identifier to
which the segment was allocated. Once the segment S is allocated, the ap-
plication server should generate the gate G corresponding to the segment
S. As previously seen, the gate is composed of two parts. The first part,
in plaintext, is the identifier of the node that created the gate. The second
part, in ciphertext, is the protection field. The protection field contains the
identifier C of the segment S and a password pAR that represent the access
right (R,W,RW ) granted to the gate. The gate that refers to key repository
have only the access right for reading (R). The protection field is encrypted
by AES with CTS mode of encryption using the application server localkey
as an encryption key. Once the application server has created the gate, it
composes the join() function’s response message. Then, application server
encrypts the message using the nonlocalkey KnlkM associated to node M
and sends it.
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Node M receives the message, it selects the nonlocalkey identified by
the key name KnlkM , and it decrypts the message. Then, the CBC-MAC of
the received message is computed. If the result is equal to the MAC code
linked in the message, then the message has not been altered. Otherwise,
node M discards the message. If the integrity check was successful, node
M checks whether the nonce that was sent to the application server in the
third step of the communication protocol is the same as the one indicated
in the join() function’s response message. If the nonces do not match, node
M discards the message. Otherwise, it saves the received gate in his gate
database. Now the node M has the gate in order to execute the protection
primitive readSegment() to access its key repository in the primary memory
of the application server.
After the application server sents the join() function’s response message
to node M, it must calculate a new application key, and distribute it to the
nodes that are part of application A.
In case that a node N which has already a key repository in the primary
memory of the application server sends another join request, the application
server does not allocate another segment, but it sends to node N the gate
which corresponds to the key repository that already exists. This is because
the join response message may be lost, and therefore the node M is forced
to perform a new join request.
A node M, which is already part of the application A, may send a join
request to a common node N. In this case the procedure is the same as
described above except that the segments are used to exchange sensed values
and that they are not as a key repository. Therefore, the size of these
segments is 4 bytes instead of 20 byte. Joining to a common node has the
only purpose to obtain a gate for accessing a remote segment, and not to
become a part of the application A. Furthermore, joining to a common node
is possible only after obtaining the application key.
Read Segment The protection primitive readSegment() is used to read
a remote segment in the primary memory of another node, and to copy its
content in their primary memory starting from address addr. Let us assume
that node M and node N are both members of application A, and, also, let
us suppose that node M has a valid gate G to access the primary memory
of node N. Let us see the operations performed by the two nodes during the
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execution of the protection primitive readSegment().
Before starting the communication protocol, node M makes sure of hav-
ing the gate G to access the primary memory of node N. Node M simply
searches through the gates in his possession the one which has the 16 least
significant bits fits to the node identifier of node N. In order to simplify we
assume that each node has at most one gate generated by a generic node X.
In case of node M does not have the gate, the protection primitive readSeg-
ment() is aborted, and M sends the join request to node N. Otherwise, node
M starts the communication protocol by sending the nonce request to node
N. If node N is free, it generates a nonce and it sends the nonce response
to node M, otherwise the request is discarded. After node M has received
the nonce response, it composes the readSegment() function’s request mes-
sage. The message is encrypted by node M using the application key as
a cryptographic key, and then it is sent to node N. The application key is
identified by a specific key name such as KA. This key name is specified in
plaintext in the message header. Node N receives the message, then selects
the encryption key which is identified by the key name KA, and finally it
decrypts the message.
It is possible that node N cannot find the encryption key having key
name KA. This is due to the fact that the application key is replaced sev-
eral times. First, node N checks the application name field of the application
key name in order to verify that the key belongs to the application A. Then,
it has to compare the key counter of his application key with the key counter
of the application key of node M. If the key counter of the application key
of node N is greater than the key counter of the application key of node M,
then node N replies with a message encrypted with the right application
key so that node M understands that its application key is obsolete. Oth-
erwise, it is node N that understands that its application key is obsolete.
As a consequence the protection primitive readSegment() is aborted and the
updated application key is retrieved from its key repository.
If the message decryption is successful, node N computes the CBC-MAC
of the received message. If the result is equal to the MAC code linked in the
message, then the message has not been altered. Otherwise, node N discards
the message. If the integrity check has been successful, node N proceeds to
validate the gate G. It is notable to recall that the gate is composed of a
part in plaintext and a part in ciphertext. Node N decrypts the ciphertext
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part getting the protection field. The protection field is formed by a segment
identifer C and a password pAR which specify the access privilege granted
to that gate. Gate validation is successful if and only if two circumstances
are achieved. In the first place there has to be a segment in the segment
table STN having the same identifier indicated in the protection field. In
the second place the password indicated in the protection field has to meet
one of the password belonging to the set of passwords corresponding to one
of the access right. In addition, node N checks whether the nonce that
was sent to the node M in the second step of the communication protocol
is the same as the one indicated in the request message. This control is
necessary to prevent replay attacks. If the nonces do not match, or if the
gate validation fails, node N sends an error message to the node M. The
error message specifies which error has been found. Otherwise, the read
segment request is accepted.
To be able to execute the protection primitive readSegment(), the gate G
must provide access privileges as R or RW. Otherwise the protection prim-
itive fails and node N sends an error message to the node M. At this point,
node N uses the segment identifier specified in the protection field to run
two operations. Firstly, to access the segment table STN ; secondly, to get
the starting address and the length of the memory area to whom the seg-
ment refers. Then, node N prepares the readSegment() function’s response
message, which includes the content of the primary memory area accessed.
This message is encrypted using the application key as the encryption key,
and then it is sent to node M.
Node M receives the message, it selects the encryption key identified by
the key name KA and, finally, it decrypts the message. Then, the CBC-
MAC of the received message is computed. If the result is equal to the
MAC code linked in the message, then the message has not been alterated.
Otherwise, node M discards the message. If the integrity check has been
successful, node M checks whether the nonce that was sent to node N in the
third step of the communication protocol is the same as the one indicated
in the response message. If the nonces do not match, node M discards the
message. Otherwise, it copies the remote segment content in his primary
memory, starting from the memory address passed as a parameter to the
protection primitive.
In case of the protection primitive readSegment() is executed to read
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a remote segment in the primary memory of the application server, the
procedure is the same as just described. The only difference is that the
messages are encrypted using the nonlocalkey instead of the application key.
Another thing to point out is that the segments created by the application
server, the key repository, have a size of 20 bytes. Conversely, the segments
created by a common node have a size of 4 bytes.
Write Segment The protection primitive writeSegment() is used to re-
place the content of a remote segment in the primary memory of another
node, with quantities taken from a memory area starting at address addr
of primary memory of the current node. Let us assume that node M and
node N are both members of application A, and, also, let us suppose that
node M has a valid gate G to access the primary memory of node N. Let us
see the operations performed by the two nodes during the execution of the
protection primitive writeSegment().
Before starting the communication protocol, node M makes sure of hav-
ing the gate G to access the primary memory of node N. Node M simply
searches through the gates in his possession. The one which has the 16 least
significant bits fits to the node identifier of node N. In order to simplify we
assume that each node has at most one gate generated by a generic node X.
In case of node M does not have the gate, the protection primitive writeSeg-
ment() is aborted, and it sends the join request to node N. Otherwise, node
M starts the communication protocol by sending the nonce request to node
N. If node N is free, it generates a nonce and it sends the nonce response
to node M, otherwise the request is discarded. After node M has received
the nonce response, it composes the writeSegment() function’s request mes-
sage, which includes the quantities taken from the memory area starting at
address addr of its primary memory. The message is encrypted by node M
using the application key as a cryptographic key, and then it is sent to node
N. The application key is identified by a specific key name such as KA. This
key name is specified in plaintext in the message header. Node N receives
the message, then selects the encryption key which is identified by the key
name KA, and finally it decrypts the message.
It is possible that node N cannot find the encryption key having key
name KA. This is due to the fact that the application key is replaced sev-
eral times. First, node N checks the application name field of the application
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key name in order to verify that the key belongs to the application A. Then,
it has to compare the key counter of his application key with the key counter
of the application key of node M. If the key counter of the application key
of node N is greater than the key counter of the application key of node M,
then node N replies with a message encrypted with the right application
key so that node M understands that its application key is obsolete. Other-
wise, it is node N that understands that its application key is obsolete. As
a consequence the protection primitive writeSegment() is aborted and the
updated application key is retrieved from its key repository.
If the message decryption is successful, node N computes the CBC-MAC
of the received message. If the result is equal to the MAC code linked in the
message, then the message has not been altered. Otherwise, node N discards
the message. If the integrity check has been successful, node N proceeds to
validate the gate G. It is notable to recall that the gate is composed of a part
in plaintext and a part in ciphertext. The node N decrypts the ciphertext
part getting the protection field. The protection field is formed by a segment
identifer C and a password pAR which specify the access privilege granted
to that gate. Gate validation is successful if and only if two circumstances
are achieved. In the first place there has to be a segment in the segment
table having the same identifier indicated in the protection field. In the
second place the password indicated in the protection field has to meet one
of the password belonging to the set of passwords corresponding to one of
the access right. In addition, node N checks whether the nonce that was sent
to the node M in the second step of the communication protocol is the same
as the one indicated in the request message. This control is necessary to
prevent replay attacks. If the nonces do not match, or if the gate validation
fails, node N sends an error message to the node M. The error message
specifies which error has been found. Otherwise, the write segment request
is accepted.
To be able to execute the protection primitive writeSegment(), the gate
G must provide access privileges as W or RW. Otherwise the protection
primitive fails and node N sends an error message to the node M. At this
point, node N uses the segment identifier specified in the protection field
to run two functions. Firstly, to access the segment table STM; secondly,
to get the starting address and the length of the memory area to whom the
segment refers. Then, node N replace the content of this memory area with
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the quantities specified in the message.
After node N has replace the segment content, it prepares the writeSeg-
ment() function’s response message, which simply includes the outcome of
the write segment request. This message is encrypted using the application
key as the encryption key, and then it is sent to node M.
Node M receives the message, it selects the encryption key identified by
the key name KA and, finally, it decrypts the message. Then, the CBC-
MAC of the received message is computed. If the result is equal to the
MAC code linked in the message, then the message has not been altered.
Otherwise, node M discards the message. If the integrity check has been
successful, node M checks whether the nonce that was sent to node N in the
third step of the communication protocol is the same as the one indicated
in the response message. If the nonces do not match, node M discards the
message. Otherwise it just checks the outcome of the protection primitive
writeSegment().
Leave A node leaves the application when it sends the leave request to the
application server. Let us assume that node M wants to leave the application
A. Node M starts the communication protocol sending the nonce request
to the application server. If the application server is free, it generates a
nonce and it sends the nonce response to node M, otherwise the request
is discarded. After node M receives the nonce response, it composes the
leave() function’s request message. The message includes the gate G which
refers to its key repository on the application server. Then, node M encrypts
the message using its own nonlocalkey and sends it to the application server.
The nonlocalkey is identified by a specific key name, such as KnlkM . This
key name is specified in plaintext in the message header.
The application server receives the message, then it selects the nonlo-
calkey identified by the key nameKnlkM and, finally, it decrypts the message.
The application server computes the CBC-MAC of the received message. If
the result is equal to the MAC code linked in the message, then the mes-
sage has not been altered. Otherwise, the application server discards the
message. If the integrity check has been successful, the application server
proceeds to validate the gate G. It is notable to recall that the gate is com-
posed of a part in plaintext and a part in ciphertext. The application server
decrypts the ciphertext part getting the protection field. The protection
CHAPTER 3. DISTRIBUTED STORAGE PROTECTION 80
field is formed by a segment identifer C and a password pAR which specify
the access privilege granted to that gate. Gate validation is successful if and
only if two circumstances are achieved. In the first place there has to be
a segment in the segment table having the same identifier indicated in the
protection field. In the second place the password indicated in the protec-
tion field has to meet one of the password belonging to the set of passwords
corresponding to one of the access right. In addition, the application server
checks whether the nonce that was sent to the node M in the second step
of the communication protocol is the same as the one indicated in the leave
request message. This control is necessary to prevent replay attacks.
If the nonces do not match, or if the gate validation fails, the application
server sends an error message to the node M. The error message specifies
which error has been found. Otherwise, the leave request is accepted. To be
able to execute the leave function, it is not important which access privilege
provides the gate G. At this point, application server uses the segment iden-
tifier specified in the protection field to access the segment table STAS and
delete that segment. The segment deletion has no influence on the primary
memory content. Once the application server has deleted the segment, it
composes the leave() function’s response message. Then, application server
encrypts the message using the nonlocalkey KnlkM associated to node M and
sends it.
Node M receives the message, it selects the nonlocalkey identified by
the key name KnlkM , and it decrypts the message. Then, the CBC-MAC of
the received message is computed. If the result is equal to the MAC code
linked in the message, then the message has not been altered. Otherwise,
node M discards the message. If the integrity check was successful, node
M checks whether the nonce that was sent to the application server in the
third step of the communication protocol is the same as the one indicated
in the leave response message. If the nonces do not match, node M discards
the message. Otherwise it just checks the outcome of the leave request.
After the application server sents the leave response message to node M,
it must calculate a new application key, and distribute it to the nodes that
are part of application A.
A node M, which is part of the application A, may send a leave request
to a common node N. In this case the procedure is the same as described
above. Leaving to a common node has the only purpose of deleting the
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remote segment that a generic node N has allocated for us, and not to leave
the application A.
3.3.3 System Initialization
In this section is explained how and when the nodes get the information
needed to perform their duties. A node, in order to perform the protection
primitives in the correct manner, should have a valid gate to be able to access
a remote segment allocated on another node. Moreover, the conversations
among nodes that are part of the same application are encrypted using
the application key. The initialization phase consists in obtaining these
information. In the following description, for node activation, it is simply
intended to turn on the node.
The first node to be activated is the application server. Indeed this node
must not carry out a real initialization phase, since it does not need to ask
for a gate to upper nodes. The application server shares a different nonlocal
key with all nodes that makes up the application.
The second node to be activated is the sink. The sink sends a join request
to the application server. The application server, after checking the validity
of the join request, allocates a segment S, the key repository, dedicated to
the sink in his primary memory. Then, it generates the gate G, providing
only read permissions for segment S, and sends it to the sink. After the
application server has sent the gate to the sink, due to the join of a new
node, it has to calculate a new application key and the corresponding key
name. It copies these informations in all the key repositories, and it sends
the rekey message to those nodes owning a key repository. At this point,
only the sink node has a key repository. After receinving the rekey message,
the sink executes the protection primitive readSegment() to the application
server. In this way the sink obtains the application key, and its initialization
phase ends.
At this point the gathering node can be activated. Gathering node ob-
tains both the gate G for accessing his key repository and the application
key, in the same way just described for the sink node. For the gathering
node the initialization phase is incomplete at this stage. Indeed, it should
also sends the join request to the sink. The sink, after checking the validity
of the join request, allocates a segment S dedicated to the gathering node in
his primary memory. Then, it generates the gate G, providing both read and
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write permissions for segment S, and sends it to the gathering node. After
the gathering node has also received the gate by the sink, its initialization
phase is completed.
Finally, the sensing nodes can be activated. The sensing node obtains
both the gate G for accessing his key repository and the application key,
in the same way just described for the sink node. This is another case in
which the initialization phase is incomplete at this stage. Indeed, a sensing
node should also sends the join request to the gathering node of its cluster.
Therefore, the sensing node will send a join request to the gathering node,
which, after checking the validity of the request, allocates a segment S ded-
icated to the sensing node in his primary memory. Then, it generates the
gate G, providing both read and write permissions for segment S, and sends
it to the sensing node. After the sensing node has also received the gate by
the gathering , its initialization phase is complete. This procedure should
be repeated for all the sensing nodes of the network.
3.3.4 Communication Protocol
In this section we analyze the communication protocol adopted in the sys-
tem. The purpose of this protocol is to ensure secrecy, integrity and avoid
replay attacks.
• join()
• readSegment()
• writeSegment()
• leave()
Let us suppose a conversation between node M and node N.
Communication protocol for join() function:
M1 M → N: nonce request
M2 N → M: EN
M3 M → N: {MAC, join,EN , EM}k
M4 N → M: {MAC, replay,EM , G}k
Communication protocol for readSegment() function:
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M1 M → N: nonce request
M2 N → M: EN
M3 M → N: {MAC, readSegment,G,EN , EM}k
M4 N → M: {MAC, replay,EM , [a]}k
Communication protocol for writeSegment() function:
M1 M → N: nonce request
M2 N → M: EN
M3 M → N: {MAC,writeSegment,G,EN , EM , [a]}k
M4 N → M: {MAC, replay,EM}k
Communication protocol for leave() function:
M1 M → N: nonce request
M2 N → M: EN
M3 M → N: {MAC, leave,G,EN , EM}k
M4 N → M: {MAC, replay,EM}k
Communication Protocol Consistency
This section will analyze the way it is managed the exchange of messages
between nodes in order to ensure the correct excecution of the communica-
tion protocol. As previously seen, the communications protocol is formed by
four messages, which can be outlined in the following way, without worrying
about the content of the messages. With reference to Fig. 3.4, the messages
that make up the communication protocol are:
M1 : nonce request
M2 : nonce replay
M3 : function request
M4 : function replay
As explained in 3.3.5, the messages M1 and M2, which are related to the only
exchange of nonces, are sent using the message format NonceMsg, while mes-
sages M3 and M4 are sent using the message format StdMsg16 or StdMsg32.
These three types of formats are received by three different receivers. The
purpose of this algorithm is to ensure the consistency of the communication
CHAPTER 3. DISTRIBUTED STORAGE PROTECTION 84
Figure 3.4: Communication Protocol
protocol. We start from an initial state where there are no active com-
munications between nodes M and N. Let us suppose that node M wants
to execute a protection primitive on a remote segment of node N. Node M
starts the communication protocol by sending the message M1 to node N. At
this point, node M wants to receive message M2 from node N. But it could
happen that at this point another node X wishes to execute a protection
primitive on a remote segment on node M, and so it sends a message M1
to node M. This situation creates an inconsistency in the communication
protocol. To avoid this unpleasant situation, node M, after it sends message
M1 to node N, discard all received messages except the messages coming
from N. Then, node N, receives message M1 from node M, and sends the
reply message M2 to node M. Once N has sent the message to the node
M, it might see a node Y wants to perform a protection primitive on a
remote segment on node N, and then sends a message M1 to the node N.
This situation creates an inconsistency in the communication protocol. To
avoid this unpleasant situation, node N, after it sends the message M2 to
the node M, discards all received messages except the messages coming from
M. Once the node M receives the message M2, it sends the message M3 to
node N. To avoid inconsistencies, at this point the node M will discard all
incoming messages except the messages coming from N. The node N re-
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ceives the message M3 from M, and responds by sending the message M4
to M. After sending the message M4, the node N is available to start a new
conversation. After receiving the message M4, the node M is available to
start a new conversation.
This simple approach can cause a deadlock; if node M after it sends the
message M1, does not receive the response message from N. To avoid that
a node issues a response indefinitely, it uses a timer, which is started after
sending the first message. Referring to Fig. 3.4, node M starts the timeout
after sending message M1, while node N starts the timeout after sending
message M2. This way, if the conversation does not end within the time
interval, the protocol is aborted, and the node is free to do other activities.
3.3.5 Message Format
This section shows the format and size of messages exchanged between
nodes. The size of messages exchanged on TinyOS is static and determined
in the implementation phase. For this reason, they have been defined three
formats of messages, with the aim of minimizing the overhead.
The three message formats are:
• NonceMsg
• StdMsg16
• StdMsg32
NonceMsg This kind of message is used for sending the nonces.
typede f n x s t r u c t NonceMsg {
n x u i n t 8 t type ;
nx u in t16 t nonce ;
} NonceMsg ;
The type field is used to specify whether it is a request for a nonce, or if
it is the answer to a request for nonce. The nonce field contains the nonce to
be transmitted. This message format is also used for signaling the rekeying
by the application server, and is used by gathering nodes for signaling to
the sensing nodes when they have to make the measurements.
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StdMsg16 This kind of message is used to support the steps 3 and 4 of
the communication protocol.
typede f n x s t r u c t StdMsg16 {
n x u i n t 8 t type ;
nx u in t32 t keyName ;
n x u i n t 8 t data [ 1 6 ] ;
} StdMsg32 ;
The type field is used to specify whether it is a request for a protection
primitive, or if it is the answer to a protection primitive. The keyName field
specifies the name of the encryption key used to encrypt the message. The
data field is an array that contains the parameters used by the protection
primitives, such as nonces, gate, function identifier, etc. The parameters
contained in this field vary according to the protection primitive, and if it is
a request or a response. Later we will analyze the contents of the data field
for each request or response to the protection primitives.
StdMsg32 This type of message is used to support the steps 3 and 4 of
the communication protocol.
typede f n x s t r u c t StdMsg32 {
n x u i n t 8 t type ;
nx u in t32 t keyName ;
n x u i n t 8 t data [ 3 2 ] ;
} StdMsg32 ;
For this message format are valid all the considerations made for StdMsg16.
The only difference is that you can send messages of larger size.
Let us see the contents of the data field for the various message types.
Let us suppose that the conversation occurs between node M and the node
N, and it is node M to initiate it.
Join Request The table 3.3 shows the configuration of data field for the
join() function’s request message.
Plaintext = 8 byte
This message is send as StdMsg16.
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Table 3.3: Join Request
0-2 3 4-5 6-7
MAC FunctionId EN EM
Join Response The table 3.4 shows the configuration of data field for the
join() function’s response message.
Table 3.4: Join Response
0-2 3 4-5 6 7-26
MAC FunctionId EN Error Gate
Plaintext = 27 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Read Segment Request The table shows the configuration of data field
for the readSegment() function’s request message.
Table 3.5: Read Segment Request
0-2 3 4-5 6-7 8-27
MAC FunctionId EN EM Gate
Plaintext = 28 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Read Segment Response The table 3.6 shows the configuration of data
field for the readSegment() function’s response message.
Table 3.6: Read Segment Response
0-2 3 4-5 6 7-26
MAC FunctionId EN Error Segment
Plaintext = 27 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Write Segment Request The table 3.7 shows the configuration of data
field for the writeSegment() function’s request message.
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Table 3.7: Write Segment Request
0-2 3 4-5 6-7 8-27 28-31
MAC FunctionId EN EM Gate Segment
Plaintext = 32 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Write Segment Response The table 3.8 shows the configuration of data
field for the writeSegment() function’s response message.
Table 3.8: Write Segment Response
0-2 3 4-5 6
MAC FunctionId EN Error
Plaintext = 7 byte
This message is send as StdMsg16.
Leave Request The table 3.9 shows the configuration of data field for
the leave() function’s request message.
Table 3.9: Leave Request
0-2 3 4-5 6-7 8-27
MAC FunctionId EN EM Gate
Plaintext = 28 byte
This message is send as StdMsg32.
Leave Response The table 3.10 shows the configuration of data field for
the leave() function’s response message.
Table 3.10: Leave Response
0-2 3 4-5 6
MAC FunctionId EN Error
Plaintext = 7 byte
This message is send as StdMsg16.
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Error Message The table 3.11 shows the configuration of data field for
the error message.
Table 3.11: Error Message
0-2 3 4-5 6
MAC FunctionId EN Error
Plaintext = 7 byte
This message is send as StdMsg16.
3.3.6 Rekeying Strategy
As explained earlier, the application key management is entrusted to the
application server. The task of the application server is to generate a new
application key whenever it is necessary. There can be many reasons to
generate a new a new application key, firstly when a new node joins the
application, secondly when a node leaves the application, and also on a pe-
riodic basis. An important concept to underline is that ”An application is
the result of the joint activities of a set of cooperating nodes” as specified
in [6]. For this reason each node, including the application server, may be
part of a single application. Nodes that are part of a certain application
use the application key to encrypt their conversations. The only exception
is the communication between a common node and the application server.
Indeed this communication is encrypted using the nonlocalkey. Each node
that is part of the application possesses a nonlocalkey dedicated to com-
municate with the application server, the application server excepted. As
a consequence, the number of nodes which form of the application should
be known a priori. Therefore, the application server should know as many
different nonlocalkeys as are the number of the nodes. We assume that each
node knows nonlocalkey in advance. The system administrator enters the
nonlocalkey during installation of the application on each node. The appli-
cation key has a value and a name. The application key value is a 16-byte
array. The application key name is a 32-bit value. The least significant 16
bits represent the key counter, while the 16 most significant bits represent
the name of the application.
When the rekey occours, the new application key value is generated using
the rand() function, while the application key name is updated by simply
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increasing the key counter by one.
Once the new application key has been generated, each key repository
allocated in the primary memory of the application server are updated with
the new information. Once this operation is complete, the application server
must communicate to all nodes that a new application key is available. This
communication is done by sending a message, called the rekey message. The
Figure 3.5: Nodes use the writeSegment() to obtain the application key from the application
server
application server sends the rekey messages one by one. The application
server knows the node identifier of the owner of each key repository. Then
he runs the segment table and sends the rekey message to the owner of each
key repository. Each node has at most a second to execute the protection
primitive readSegment(), to copy the key repository contents in its primary
memory. Afterwards the application server sends the rekey message to the
next node. If everything ran correctly, the whole process of rekeying em-
ploys a time which is proportional to the number of nodes multiplied by the
duration of the protection primitive readSegment(). If the application server
receives a new join request during the rekey process, the process is stopped
and it is started again when the new node has received the gate.
The approach of sending the rekey message node by node avoids some
disadvantages that would arise in case of the rekey message was sent in
broadcast. Indeed, the rekey message will be received by the nodes almost
simultaneously. This means that if each node performs the protection prim-
itive readSegment() as soon as the rekey message is received, an unwanted
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situation on the application server could be caused. The application server
is indeed able to satisfy only a request at a time. Hence, in case of multi-
ple simultaneous requests only the first request would be granted and any
other would be discarded. To avoid this non-desirable situation each node
should wait a random time before performing the protection primitive read-
Segment() after receiving the rekey message. The time interval within which
the random delay should be generated should be very large to minimize the
probability of collision, making the rekey process much slower. Moreover,
with the broadcast approach, all nodes including those that are no longer
part of the application would be aware of the availability of a new applica-
tion key. The only disadvantage of the first approach is that the application
server needs to send a rekey message for every key repository, instead of just
one.
3.3.7 Sensing Strategy
This session will explain the sensing strategy adopted by the system. As
Figure 3.6: Sensing. Each node writes the result in the primary memory of its parent node
previosly seen, nodes are organized in a hierarchical structure. The lowest
level is formed by the sensing nodes, the intermediate level is formed by the
gathering node, while the highest level is represented by the sink. Sensing
is performed periodically, and is orchestrated by gathering nodes. Obvi-
ously, the sensing can begin after the initialization phase of the system is
completed. In the gathering node it is implemented a periodic timer, which
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generates an event each time a certain time interval is elapsed. When this
event occurs, the gathering node sends a message to each sensing nodes of
its cluster to require the reading of the environmental parameter. When the
sensing nodes receive the message, first check if it comes from the gathering
node belonging to their cluster. If this is true, each sensing node performs
the measurement, and by the protection primitive writeSegment(), stores
the result in the primary memory of his gathering node. The gathering
node, after it has received the value form the last sensing node, proceed
to performs the aggregation. The aggregation function implemented, is the
maximum function. The gathering nodes reads in his primary memory the
values present in the segments allocated to the sensing nodes of its cluster,
and calculates the maximum value. This task is facilitated by the fact that
the gathering node allocates segments only for sensing node belonging to his
cluster. In case where a sensing node is not able to write the new data into
the primary memory of his gathering node, the aggregation is done by us-
ing the previous value. Once the nodes have finished data aggregation, the
gathering node performs the protection primitive writeSegment(), writing
the data in the sink’s primary memory.
3.3.8 Sink
The sink node deserves a separate discussion. Unlike other nodes, the sink
is implemented in Java, moreover it is not a mote, but it is a standard
computer. As described in 2.3.11, it uses a mote as antenna, in order to
communicate using the standard 802.15.4. As mentioned in section 2.3.11,
the modified version of the BaseStation application must be installed on
this mote. In addition to the functionalities of a normal node, such as the
protection primitives, the sink provides a graphical user interface shown in
figure 3.7. All received messages are shown on the screen. It also creates a
log file with the information that come from gathering node. To facilitate
the launch of the application an executable script called DSDStart.sh is
used. Before the execution of the script, both access rights to read and
write should be granted to the serial port where the mote, that is used as an
antenna, is connected. The Clear button, has the only function of clearing
the text area.
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Figure 3.7: Client side application GUI
3.3.9 Scalability
The figure 3.3 shows the architecture of the application in which there is
only one cluster formed by one gathering node and by three sensing node.
Due to the fact that each node must share a different nonlocalkey with
the application server, it is not possible to add more nodes at runtime.
Instead, in the implementation phase, adding a sensing node to the cluster
or adding a new cluster is very simple and fast. It is sufficient to add to
the application server the nonlocal keys to be shared with these additional
nodes. The limit to the expansion of the network is the size of the primary
memory of the application server, which need to store a key repository for
each node belonging to the application. It can be told that this application
is scalable.
3.4 Performance Evaluation
To analyze the performance of this application the evaluation method sug-
gested by [8] has been followed. The execution time of a function is measured
using timers. TinyOS provides several types of timers with different time
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precision (milliseconds, microseconds, etc.). This analysis has been carried
out by using the interface LocalTime and its component LocalTimeMilliC
in order to calculate the execution time. Here, LocalTime [9] interface is
reported.
i n t e r f a c e LocalTime<p r e c i s i o n t a g>
{
async command u i n t 3 2 t get ( ) ;
}
The get() function returns the current time. Using the get() function,
the current time is taken at the beginning and at the end of the function in
question. Then, the execution time is calculated as the difference between
the two time instants. The value obtained is then inserted into the payload
of the next packet. To make this analysis possible, the original application
should be slightly modified by adding the timer module. Performance was
measured using mote Tmote Sky [5] equipped with the CC2420 radio [10].
The motes were powered through the computer’s USB port.
Join In the figure 3.8 is shown the performance graph of the function
join().
µ = 8370 75 90 95 100
1
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.2
Time(ms)
ϕµ,θ2(Time)
Figure 3.8: join() execution time
The join() function has an average execution time of 83 milliseconds,
with a variance of 31 square milliseconds.
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Read Segment In the figure 3.9 is shown the performance graph of the
function readSegment().
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Figure 3.9: readSegment() execution time
The readSegment() function has an average execution time of 95 millisec-
onds, with a variance of 42 square milliseconds. The execution time greater
than the other functions, is justified by the fact that both request message
and response message have the body 32 bytes large.
Write Segment In the figure 3.10 is shown the performance graph of the
function writeSegment().
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Figure 3.10: writeSegment() execution time
The writeSegment() function has an average execution time of 84 mil-
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liseconds, with a variance of 37 square milliseconds.
Leave In the figure 3.11 is shown the performance graph of the function
leave().
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Figure 3.11: leave() execution time
The leave() function has an average execution time of 82 milliseconds,
with a variance of 30 square milliseconds.
Gate Validation In the figure 3.12 is shown the performance graph of
the function gateValidation().
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Figure 3.12: gateValidation() execution time
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The gateValidation() function has an average execution time of 5 mil-
liseconds, with a variance of 0.3 square milliseconds. The protection prim-
itive gateValidation() does not requires messages exchange between nodes.
For this reason the variance is very low compared to the other functions
analyzed.
Chapter 4
Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to create applications in the field of security in
wireless sensor networks that would guarantee a high level of protection at
a low computational cost. The devices used, the Tmote Sky, have limited
resources and are also battery supplied. This makes the research and the
implementation of efficient solutions fundamental.
In the first application, a sensor node (mote) is treated as a passive ob-
ject that provides functionalities. An access privilege is composed of one or
more access rights, and each access right is associated with a functionality.
A password system implemented as a bidimensional hierarchical one-way
chains is associated with the mote. Each password is associated with a
different access privilege. A subject can access the mote only if it has a
password corresponding to one of the passwords associated with the mote.
These passwords are used as authentication keys for calculating a MAC code
using the CBC-MAC algorithm. A user asks the mote to perform a func-
tionality by sending a request message, in which he fits the MAC calculated
with his authentication key. When the mote receives the request, it calcu-
lates the MAC of the message and compares it with the MAC contained in
the message. If these two MAC are different the request is rejected. If the
password grants sufficient privileges to perform the required functionality,
this is satisfied. The messages are encrypted using the AES-CBC cipher al-
gorithm using the cryptographic key shared between the user and the mote.
Furthermore, the security protocol involves the use of nonces to avoid re-
play attacks. The advantages of using a password system implemented as a
bidimensional hierarchical one-way chains are various. Firstly, all passwords
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or only a subset of these can be revoked by changing the one-way function
used to calculate the chains. Secondly, the key derivation mechanism allows
a user that has a password to obtain a weaker password and to distribute
it to other users, avoiding a centralized approach with a password man-
ager. Therefore, the application both grants and revokes access rights with
high flexibility. The performance analysis shows that the overhead due to
the protection mechanisms is absolutely tolerable, thanks to a very efficient
implementation of the algorithm AES-CBC.
In the second application a scenario in which a set of nodes cooper-
ate to monitor a generic environmental parameter has been considered. A
generic node can access a remote segment allocated in the primary mem-
ory of another node, presenting a gate that certifies the access right to that
segment. The gate is a kind of pointer protected cryptographically. While
in a classical approach each segment is associated with a set of passwords,
the approach pursued in this thesis uses only one set of passwords for each
node. The set consists of three passwords, each of which represents a differ-
ent access right (R, W, RW). The gate is composed of a plaintext part that
specifies the node on which the segment is allocated, and by an encrypted
part, called protection field, which specifies the identifier of the segment
to which the gate refers, and, finally, from one of the passwords of the set.
The protection field is encrypted using AES-CBC-CTS with a cryptographic
key, called localkey, which is known by that node only. The possible opera-
tions on a remote segment are to read the segment contents and to replace
these contents. These operations take place using the protection primitives.
Nodes communicate with each other using a cryptographic key called ap-
plication key that is handled by a special node called application servers.
The application server calculates a new application key each time a node
joins/leaves the application as well as on a periodic basis. When one of
the three events described above occurs, the application server calculates a
new application key and inserts it into the key repositories, which are spe-
cial segments allocated for each node that is part of the application. Then,
the application server sends a rekey message to each node. When a node
receives a rekey message, it uses the protection primitive readSegment() to
read the contents of the key repository. Indeed, the node must have a valid
gate in order to be able to read the contents of the segment. Each node
shares a key with the application server, called nonlocal key, used only for
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the node-application server communications. Sensing is coordinated by the
gathering node and performed by sensing nodes in that cluster. The gather-
ing node implements a periodic timer, and whenever it fires, the gathering
node sends a message to the sensing nodes to require the reading of the envi-
ronmental parameter. Each sensing node reads the parameter and writes it
in the primary memory of the gathering node using the protection primitive
writeSegment(). When the gathering node receives the values from all the
sensing node of its cluster, it aggregates them and writes the result in the
sink primary memory using the protection primitive writeSegment(). This
implementation provides scalability. If it is needed to add more nodes to
the system, it is sufficient to add the shared nonlocal keys to the application
server. Even in such case the analysis of the performance shows that the
overhead due to the protection mechanisms is completely tolerable, thanks
to a very efficient implementation of the algorithm AES-CBC.
Appendix A
Additional performance
This section shows the performance of the algorithms that are common to
both applications described in this thesis. These are very useful in under-
standing the performance of the two applications. The performance of the
functions in this appendix have been measured using Tmote Sky equipped
with the CC2420 radio.
A.1 AES
In the figure A.1 is shown the performance graph of the function AES both
the CBC mode and CBC-CTS mode.
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Figure A.1: AES execution time in both CBC and CBC-CTS encryption modes
The graph shows that the two encryption modes have almost the same
execution time. To encrypt a block of 16 bytes takes on average 2 millisec-
onds. The key expansion time the is not reported in the graphic, but it
takes about 640 milliseconds.
A.2 CBC-MAC
In the figure A.2 is shown the performance graph of the function CBC-MAC.
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Figure A.2: CBC-MAC execution time
The function CBC-MAC uses the AES-128 CBC seen previously. It is
not surprising therefore that the execution times are the same. In this case
the execution time also includes the key expansion.
A.3 HMAC-SHA-256-128
In the figure A.3 is shown the performance graph of the function HMAC-
SHA-256-128 and SHA-256.
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Figure A.3: HMAC-SHA-256-128 and SHA-256 execution time
The performance of HMAC are worse than the performance of the CBC-
MAC, for this reason it is used as a one-way function for the construction
of the bidimensional hierarchiacal one-way chains and not to authenticate
messages.
A.4 Send Packet
In the figure A.4 is shown the time it takes the mote to send a packet.
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Figure A.4: Send execution time
It is interesting to note how the time taken from the mote to send a
packet grows about 1 millisecond each time the plaintext grows of 8 byte.
A.5 Round Trip Time
In the figure A.5 is shown the round trip time, while in figure A.6 is shown
the statistical distribution of the round trip time.
APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE 106
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
Payload Size (byte)
T
im
e
(m
s)
Figure A.5: Round trip time
10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.2
Time(ms)
ϕµ,θ2(Time)
payload = 8 byte
payload = 16 byte
payload = 24 byte
payload = 32 byte
payload = 40 byte
payload = 48 byte
Figure A.6: RTT distribution
This experiment measures the time it takes a packet to be sent to another
node and back. The execution time grows to the size of the payload following
the same trend seen in the computation of the execution time of the send
packet. The interesting aspect is the statistical distribution of the round
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trip time, which justifies all the measured performances for the functions
implemented in the two applications developed in this thesis.
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